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ABSTRACT
In 2012, the Department of Homeland Security adopted a risk classification
assessment (“RCA”) tool to run on migrants in the custody of Immigration and
Customs Enforcement (“ICE”). The risk tool helped determine who was
detained and who was released from ICE custody. It was intended to curb
detention rates by limiting detention based on risk of flight and danger and to
ensure that the conditions of civil immigration detention were distinct from
those in criminal detention. This Article presents data from several RCA datasets received pursuant to the Freedom of Information Act.
The story of the RCA is one of manipulation, subversion, and bias. In this
study, we examine the RCA’s outcomes for migrants with special vulnerabilities, migrants subject to mandatory detention, and migrants eligible for bond
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and release. We demonstrate that over time the risk tool recommended
release or bond for fewer and fewer categories. Further, ICE officers’ punitive use of detention defeated attempts at top-down reform and resulted in
detention without bond for nearly every migrant.
As the Biden administration faces mounting criticism over its detention policy,
our results amplify calls to shift the paradigm in immigration enforcement and
to eliminate the use of detention as the predominant method of immigration
control.
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INTRODUCTION
The Biden administration took office amid promises to promote racial justice, decarceration, and a humane approach to immigration enforcement.1 A
flurry of executive orders and policy memoranda announced the administration’s efforts toward each goal.2 However, immigrants as well as their families and advocates have watched a disturbing increase in the number of
people detained.3 Indeed, rather than reversing course from the Trump
administration predecessor, these commitments appeared to be sidelined.4
This increase portends a return to the detention policies of the Obama and
Trump administrations: mass incarceration of Black, Latinx, and Asian
migrants5 under the guise of risk mitigation.
Since 2012, the decision to detain or release someone after an arrest for an
immigration violation has been guided by the Risk Classification Assessment
1. See The Biden Plan for Securing Our Values as a Nation of Immigrants, BIDEN HARRIS
DEMOCRATS, https://perma.cc/NE66-QTAP; The Biden Plan to Build Back Better by Advancing Racial
Equity across the American Economy, BIDEN HARRIS DEMOCRATS, https://perma.cc/5DK2-94LB; The
Biden Plan for Strengthening America’s Commitment to Justice, BIDEN HARRIS DEMOCRATS, https://
perma.cc/4T5F-XRU8; Lisa Lerer, Biden’s Sky-High Promises on Racial Justice, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 24,
2021), https://perma.cc/9UE2-UNVU.
2. E.g., Advancing Racial Equity and Support for Underserved Communities through the Federal
Government, Exec. Order No. 13,985, 86 Fed. Reg. 7009 (Jan. 20, 2021); Revision of Civil Immigration
Enforcement Policies and Priorities, Exec. Order No. 13,993, 86 Fed. Reg. 7051 (Jan. 20, 2021);
Reforming Our Incarceration System to Eliminate the Use of Privately Operated Criminal Detention
Facilities, Exec. Order No. 14,006, 86 Fed. Reg. 7483 (Jan. 26, 2021); Establishment of Interagency Task
Force on the Reunification of Families, Exec. Order No. 14,011, 86 Fed. Reg. 8273 (Feb. 2, 2021).
3. JORGE LOWEREE & AARON REICHLIN-MELNICK, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, TRACKING THE BIDEN
AGENDA ON IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT 22–23 (2021), https://perma.cc/3LES-5L6Z; Hamed Aleaziz,
The Number of Immigrants Jailed by ICE Has Ballooned under Biden This Year, BUZZFEED NEWS (June
29, 2021, 6:17 PM), https://perma.cc/K3VM-GXE8; Philip Marcelo & Gerald Herbert, Immigrant
Detentions Soar Despite Biden’s Campaign Promises, ASSOCIATED PRESS (Aug. 5, 2021), https://perma.
cc/2TVU-5MRQ; NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., ROADMAP TO DISMANTLE THE U.S. IMMIGRATION
DETENTION SYSTEM, (2021), https://perma.cc/S28L-ZZBX.
4. LOWEREE & REICHLIN-MELNICK, supra note 3, at 18–24; Walter Ewing, Biden’s Actions on
Immigration Enforcement Have Been Inconsistent Since Taking Office, IMMIGR. IMPACT (May 20, 2021),
https://perma.cc/MFS5-7PGU.
5. This Article uses the word “migrants” throughout to avoid both the legal significance of the word
“immigrant” and the offensive nature of the term “alien,” which is still used in the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”). See generally MAI NGAI, Introduction, in IMPOSSIBLE SUBJECTS: ILLEGAL
ALIENS AND THE MAKING OF MODERN AMERICA (2d ed. 2014). In April 2021, both ICE and CBP issued
memorandums instructing agency officials to use “preferred terminology and inclusive language,” aligning communications practices with the Biden administration’s guidance. See Memorandum from Tae
Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, to ICE Leadership, Updated Terminology for
Communications and Materials (Apr. 19, 2021); Memorandum from Troy A. Miller, Senior Off.
Performing Duties of the Comm’r, U.S. Customs & Border Prot., Updated Terminology for CBP
Communications and Materials (Apr. 19, 2021); see also Memorandum from Jean King, Acting Dir.,
Exec. Off. For Immigr. Review, Terminology (July 26, 2021).
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(“RCA”) system.6 The RCA is an automated risk tool designed to recommend whether to detain or release migrants pending resolution of removal
charges.7 Modeled on evidence-based criminal justice reforms,8 the RCA
combines database records and interview information into a weighted scoring
system that produces public safety and flight risk assessments of “low,” “medium,” or “high” and issues a corresponding custody recommendation.9 The
RCA was programmed to generate one of four recommendations: (1) detain
in the custody of the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) (no bond);
(2) detain, but with an accompanying recommended bond amount; (3) supervisor to determine; and (4) release.10 An Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (“ICE”) supervisor then reviews the RCA recommendation and
any accompanying comments and makes a final custody decision including
any conditions for detention or release.11
In 2014, this research project, called Risk Assessment in Immigration
Detention (“RAID”),12 introduced the immigration RCA for detention to
readers of the Georgetown Immigration Law Journal.13 The article argued
that the risk tool would not reduce current levels of over-detention.14 It contended that competing immigration laws and policies undermined an effective
and accurate risk assessment.15 Author Robert Koulish later introduced data
from the tool’s pilot in Baltimore, Maryland during 2012.16 That study
remarked on the high detention rates and the inability of risk to predict whether
or not an individual would be detained.17 More recently, in a joint study,18 the

6. Kate Evans & Robert Koulish, Manipulating Risk: Immigration Detention Through Automation,
24 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 789, 802 (2020).
7. Id. at 793.
8. See Memorandum to Phyllis Coven, Acting Dir., Off. of Detention Pol’y and Plan., on Simulation
of Custody Levels Under the Current Detention Standard and the Proposed Changes to Intake Processing
(Nov. 18, 2010), in CONSOLIDATED RCA FOIA DOCUMENT RELEASE 2016-ICLI-00018, DUKE L.
SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY 506–07, https://perma.cc/7K8T-Y3VD [hereinafter CONSOLIDATED FOIA
RESPONSES]; see also Marie VanNostrand & Gena Keebler; Pretrial Risk Assessment in the Federal
Court, 73 FED. PROBATION 3, 4 (2009) (describing pretrial detention decisions as based on an assessment
of risk of flight and risk of danger to the community); CHRISTOPHER T. LOWENKAMP, MARIE
VANNOSTRAND & ALEXANDER HOLSINGER, THE HIDDEN COSTS OF PRETRIAL DETENTION, ARNOLD
FOUND. 8 (2013) (describing Kentucky’s risk assessment tool used for pretrial detention).
9. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 802–05; ATP RULES MATRIX V.3, DUKE L. SCHOLARSHIP
REPOSITORY (n.d.) [hereinafter RCA RULES AND SCORING], https://perma.cc/7K8T-Y3VD (Logic-Based
Scoring Rules, Points-Based Scoring Rules, Crime Codes).
10. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 805.
11. Id.
12. RAID, which is organized by Professors Robert Koulish, Kate Evans, and Ernesto Calvo, is
housed at the University of Maryland and Duke University School of Law.
13. See generally Mark Noferi & Robert Koulish, The Immigration Detention Risk Assessment, 29
GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 45 (2014).
14. Id. at 74.
15. Id. at 50–52.
16. See generally Robert Koulish, Immigration Detention in the Risk Classification Assessment Era,
16 CONN. PUB. INT. L.J. 3, 6 (2016) (explaining “the limited impact of RCA on ICE detention
outcomes”).
17. Id. at 18.
18. See generally Evans & Koulish, supra note 6.
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authors analyzed the “black box” algorithm19 to demonstrate the manipulation of the risk tool over time and linked more restrictive detention outcomes
to substantial changes in the risk algorithm.20
This Article is the culmination of several years of research on the RAID
Project. It breaks down the broad analysis by Mark Noferi and Koulish21 and
goes inside the algorithmic black box previously analyzed by the authors.
With the original empirical data presented here, we examine the carceral
immigrant state and the mechanisms at play in detaining immigrants despite
the best-made rhetoric on taming detention. Our analysis reveals the effects
of ICE’s manipulation of the RCA algorithm on detention cases and demonstrates how the RCA’s recommendations and ICE’s detention decisions grew
increasingly punitive over time. In sum, we see ICE detaining lower-risk
individuals at almost the same rate as higher-risk ones. That is, ICE has used
the risk tool as an instrument to legitimize detention, not limit it.
Summary Findings
Detention
� About 18 percent of immigrants in ICE custody are mandatorily detained
under § 236(c) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”).
� Almost 20 percent of immigrants in ICE custody are detained despite
eligibility for bond under INA § 236(a).
� Almost 55 percent of immigrants in ICE custody are in some expedited process and are not scheduled to see an immigration judge.
� Few detained migrants have committed violent offenses.
� Most cases with “high” flight-risk assessments receive the designation automatically because the individuals are in expedited removal,
even if they are asylum seekers with family ties in the United States
and strong incentives to pursue their cases in immigration court.
Special Vulnerabilities
� ICE underutilizes the special vulnerabilities designation to protect
migrants who face particularly severe harm in detention.
� Only 6 percent of people processed through the RCA were designated as having special vulnerabilities
� People with special vulnerabilities are more likely than those without special vulnerabilities to be released.
� An overwhelming majority of people with special vulnerabilities are
nonetheless detained.

19. See generally FRANK PASQUALE, THE BLACK BOX SOCIETY: THE SECRET ALGORITHMS THAT
CONTROL MONEY AND INFORMATION (2015). Pasquale emphasizes the risks involved in secretive algorithms, particularly when liberty is at stake. Id. at 8, 52 (He says that demanding transparency is a first
step towards creating a more democratic process.).
20. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 846–48.
21. See generally Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13.
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Changes to the RCA Algorithm and their Impact:
� Between 2012 and 2019 ICE increasingly detained lower-risk immigrants.
� ICE removed bond eligibility from the RCA recommendations in
2015.
� ICE suspended the release recommendation for all immigrants in
2017.
� By 2019 nearly every migrant was detained without bond regardless
of risk level.
The RCA was created and implemented alongside a broader array of
reforms adopted by the Obama administration to focus immigration enforcement efforts on certain categories of migrants.22 These efforts faced opposition from two sources: (1) court challenges that prevented the broader
prosecutorial discretion programs from being implemented;23 and (2) resistance from ICE officers to restrictions on arrests and detention.24
Our analysis dissects this quasi principal-agent dilemma25—ICE officers’
subversion of the directives issued by political appointees26—as a lesson to
be learned by the Biden administration. Perhaps the most intractable problem
Biden faces is overcoming a highly discretionary and punitive culture within
ICE bent on detaining and removing as many migrants as possible. Scholars
have documented that punishment, even cruelty, is the objective of ICE’s
operations.27 Scholars and advocates have similarly shown that ICE intransigence to reform is hard-wired from within.28 Our work serves as an
22. Christie Thompson, Deporting ‘Felons, Not Families,’ MARSHALL PROJECT (Nov. 21, 2014, 5:22
PM), https://perma.cc/Z9KB-PS7A. Though the felons, not families policy ostensibly focused
enforcement actions on security threats and violent criminal offenders it also ensnared large numbers of
families, including many fleeing persecutions, through its enforcement priorities. Id
23. See generally Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming a challenge brought
by Texas and twenty-five other states seeking to block the implementation of DAPA and expansion of
DACA), aff’d by an equally divided court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016).
24. See, e.g., Crane v. Johnson, 783 F.3d 244 (5th Cir. 2015) (challenge to DACA by ICE officials);
Julia Preston, Agents Sue over Deportation Suspensions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 23, 2012), https://perma.cc/
4XP8-A3AC.
25. Principle-agent scholarship, primarily in economics and political science, shows that policymakers and bureaucracies have different incentive structures. See, e.g., Brian J. Cook & B. Dan Wood,
Principal-Agent Models of Political Control of Bureaucracy, 83 AM. POL. SCI. REV. 965 (1989).
26. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text; Jennifer Lee Koh, Downsizing the Deportation
State, 17 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. (forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at 17–19) (describing the dynamic
between frontline officers and political appointees in the immigration context); id. at 13 (“The legal
framework developed by the courts and Congress facilitates the tremendous power exercised by the deportation state’s front line, which it exercises with very little accountability.”).
27. E.g., ADAM GOODMAN, THE DEPORTATION MACHINE: AMERICA’S LONG HISTORY OF EXPELLING
IMMIGRANTS ch. 5 (2020); César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, Immigration Detention as Punishment,
61 UCLA L. REV. 1346, 1349 (2014) (“By so intertwining immigration detention and penal incarceration,
Congress created an immigration detention legal architecture that, in contrast with the prevailing legal
characterization, is formally punitive.”); Anil Kalhan, Rethinking Immigration Detention, 110 COLUM. L.
REV. SIDEBAR 42, 49 (2010) (“Immigration detention has embraced the ‘aesthetic’ and ‘technique’ of
incarceration, evolving for many detainees into a quasi-punitive regime far out of alignment with immigration custody’s permissible purposes.”).
28. See, e.g., Adam B. Cox & Cristina M. Rodrı́guez, The President and Immigration Law Redux,
125 YALE L.J. 104, 187–90 (2015) (discussing the history of ICE’s resistance to deferred action); Ahilan
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intervention in the literature discussing the differences and trade-offs
between regulating through rules versus standards.29 Our research suggests
the choice of regulatory method may not matter on the ground; instead, what
may matter most is the choice of regulator.
Our study exposes ICE officers’ efficacy in subverting attempts to mitigate
the use of detention. Over time, the tool was manipulated and overridden to
the point that its founding risk was jettisoned. Instead, ICE imposed detention
without justification. With the veil of risk removed, all that remains is the
high rate of detention the RCA was intended to prevent. More broadly, just as
risk assessment systems have failed to prevent the widespread incarceration
of Black and Brown people in the criminal justice system,30 the RCA has
similarly failed to wean out racial bias in the immigration enforcement system.31 Two conclusions emerge: (1) immigration detention is used to punish;
and (2) the punitive bias of ICE officers to detain and deter has prevailed over
efforts for reform.
The Biden administration is poised to fail in its efforts to reform immigration detention for the same reasons the Obama administration did.32 In Spring
2021, ICE publicly refuted President Biden’s new enforcement priorities, just
as it had Obama’s and instead adhered to its own punitive habitus.33 The
agency again demonstrated how intransigent organizational culture can result
from broad delegations of discretion.34 Further, the administration has
retreated from strict oversight of ICE officers’ focus on enforcement

Arulanantham, The President’s Relief Program as a Response to Insurrection, BALKINIZATION (Nov. 25,
2014), https://perma.cc/UR6X-4ZA2 (describing “a historical context of defiance—some would say
insurrection—by ICE enforcement agents and attorneys who essentially refused to implement prior
´
, JEREMY SLACK & JOSIAH HEYMAN,
directives on prosecutorial priorities”); DANIEL E. MARTINEZ
BORDERING ON CRIMINAL: THE ROUTINE ABUSE OF MIGRANTS IN THE REMOVAL SYSTEM, PART 1:
MIGRANT MISTREATMENT WHILE IN U.S. CUSTODY, IMMIGR. POL’Y CTR. (2013); JOSIAH HEYMAN,
´
, WHY BORDER PATROL AGENTS AND CBP OFFICERS SHOULD
JEREMY SLACK & DANIEL E. MARTINEZ
NOT SERVE AS ASYLUM OFFICERS, CTR. FOR MIGRATION STUD. ESSAYS (2019).
29. See, e.g., FREDERICK SCHAUER, PLAYING BY THE RULES: A PHILOSOPHICAL EXAMINATION OF
RULEBASED DECISION-MAKING IN LAW AND IN LIFE (1991); Michael Coenen, Rules Against Rulification,
124 YALE L.J. 576 (2014); Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J.
557, 585 (1993); Cass Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 CAL. L. REV. 953 (1995).
30. See generally KELLY ROBERTS FREEMAN, CATHY HU & JESSE JANNETTA, RACIAL EQUITY AND
CRIMINAL JUSTICE RISK ASSESSMENT (2021); Julia Angwin, Jeff Larson, Surya Mattu & Lauren Kirchner,
Machine Bias, PROPUBLICA (May 23, 2016), https://perma.cc/3N6Y-2CX4.
31. Amada Armenta, Racializing Crimmigration: Structural Racism, Colorblindness, and the
Institutional Production of Immigrant Criminality, 3 SOC. RACE & ETHNICITY 82, 94 (2016).
32. Koh, supra note 26 (manuscript at 3, 18); Early Immigration Actions Taken by the Biden
Administration, AM. IMMIGR. LAWYERS ASS’N (Apr. 29, 2021), https://perma.cc/Y4V6-37SP.
33. By habitus we mean its own constitution or, “way of doing things.” Nicole Narea, Biden Is
Trying to Rein in ICE with New Immigration Enforcement Priorities, VOX (Feb. 19, 2021, 2:20 PM),
https://perma.cc/8GHY-TAVQ; Koh, supra note 26 (manuscript at 13); John Washington, ICE
Subverting Biden’s Priorities for Detention and Deportation, INTERCEPT (May 7, 2021, 10:59 AM),
https://perma.cc/65UL-N4FV.
34. See Michael J. Churgin, Immigration Internal Decisionmaking: A View from History, 78 TEX. L.
REV. 1633, 1659–60 (2000); Washington, supra note 33; Peter L. Markowitz, After ICE: A New Humane
& Effective Immigration Enforcement Paradigm, 55 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 89, 103–04 (2020) (describing ICE as “a rogue agency unconstrained by the constitution and other legal limits”).
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priorities in its initial directive35 and instead left the final decision as to who
to arrest, detain, and prosecute to officer discretion.36 The Biden administration’s embrace of ICE’s enforcement ethos and ultimate choice as to policy
implementation is likely to undermine its success at limiting detention.37
Our evidence shows that the Biden administration cannot achieve its goals
of decarceration, racial equity, and the creation of a fair and humane immigration system without dismantling the immigration detention machinery. It
must abandon hidden algorithms that are subject to abuse from top to bottom.
It should seek to eliminate immigration provisions from the Clinton era that
are largely responsible for mass immigrant incarceration. It must commit to
radically rethinking the use of immigration detention and enforcement methods. President Biden, like reform-minded predecessors, must overcome ICE
resistance or fall victim to it.
The Article is presented as follows. Part I lays out the legal framework for
immigration detention and how the RCA operates within this system. It also
covers the RCA’s genesis in the convergence of immigration and criminal
enforcement systems and its role in reinforcing a narrative that equates
migrants with criminals. Part II describes the data and methodology we use
to analyze the impact of the RCA. Part III describes the empirical findings
that demonstrate the manipulation of the risk tool toward an ever more punitive system of immigration detention in order to accommodate ICE officer
bias. In Part IV, we explore the implications of our study for vulnerable
migrants, the mandatory detention statutes, and the future of risk assessment
in guiding immigration detention, and the nature of immigration enforcement
moving forward. Our findings support existing calls to abolish ICE in its current form and to move toward an enforcement model centered on community
support and pathways for legal integration.38 We conclude by calling on the
Biden administration to end the rampant and unjustified immigration detention that the RCA facilitated and that has characterized modern immigration
enforcement.
35. See Memorandum from Tae D. Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t to All ICE
Employees 5 (Feb. 18, 2021), https://perma.cc/6U6U-X7DL.
36. See Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to Tae D.
Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 5 (Sept. 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/U5Z2-NRU4.
37. Id. at 1 (stating that “I am grateful to [the Acting Director of ICE], the other leaders of U.S.
Immigration and Customs Enforcement, and our frontline personnel for the candor and openness of the
engagements we have had to help shape this guidance. Thank you especially for dedicating yourselves—
all your talent and energy—to the noble law enforcement profession. In executing our solemn responsibility to enforce immigration law with honor and integrity, we can help achieve justice and realize our ideals
as a Nation.”)
38. See, e.g., Markowitz, supra note 34, at 129–40; Koh, supra note 26 (manuscript at 18–28); Laila
L. Hlass, Lawyering from a Deportation Abolition Ethic, 110 CALIF. L. REV. (forthcoming in 2022);
RANDY CAPPS & DORIS MEISSNER, MIGRANT POL’Y INST. FROM JAILERS TO CASE MANAGERS:
REDESIGNING THE U.S. IMMIGRATION SYSTEM TO BE EFFECTIVE AND FAIR 13–22 (2021); Nana Gyamifi,
Until We’re Free: Open Letter to President Biden, BLACK ALLIANCE FOR JUST IMMIGR., https://perma.cc/
WU6D-4H5Z; Letter to Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec’y of Dep’t of Homeland Sec. (June 28, 2021),
https://perma.cc/6V4P-CPLX; Sarah Sherman-Stokes, Opinion, There is Nothing ‘Civil’ or Human About
the Detention of Noncitizens, HILL (May 28, 2021, 8 :00 AM), https://perma.cc/EVS7-WX4F.
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THE FRAMEWORK FOR THE RCA

The RCA’s stated functions were to ensure that the use of immigration
detention aligns with its civil purpose and to promote consistency and transparency in ICE officers’ custody determinations through the use of an algorithm.39 In this Part, we explain the rationale for and restrictions on civil
immigration detention, how the RCA fits into ICE’s enforcement procedures,
and the RCA’s origins in the criminal justice system.
A.

The Legal Parameters for Immigration Detention

The Fifth Amendment’s guarantee of liberty absent due process of law
generally prohibits civil detention.40 The Supreme Court has recognized that
detention for non-punitive purposes may be permissible in “special” and
“narrow” circumstances.41 Civil detention in support of immigration enforcement has a long history as one of these special and narrow circumstances.42
Accordingly, detention must be non-punitive in purpose and effect, in addition to having a special justification that outweighs the individual’s interest in
their liberty.43 Those justifications are limited to (1) ensuring the appearance
of migrants at future immigration proceedings or for their removal from the
country; and (2) preventing danger to the community.44 However, these justifications are not sufficiently strong to justify civil detention in every case.45
Moreover, if removal is unlikely, the government’s interest in preventing
flight becomes “weak or nonexistent.”46 The Court has also explained that
prior criminal history alone is insufficient to justify preventative civil detention.47 Instead, detention must be limited in duration and restricted to especially “dangerous” people or those who are likely to flee enforcement.48
The Court has articulated these principles through a series of challenges to
statutes governing detention preceding and succeeding an order of removal
issued by an immigration judge or the Board of Immigration Appeals.
Specifically, the Court has upheld Congress’s detention provisions following
a final order of removal but only so far as detention is supported by these two
justifications.49 Similarly, the Court has upheld civil immigration detention

39. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 833.
40. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690 (2001); Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71, 80 (1992);
Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 356 (1997).
41. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690 (quoting Foucha, 504 U.S. at 80); Hendricks, 521 U.S. at 357.
42. See Wong Wing v. United States, 163 U.S. 228, 235 (1896) (“We think it clear that detention, or
temporary confinement, as part of the means necessary to give effect to the provisions for the exclusion or
expulsion of aliens, would be valid.”).
43. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 538 (1979)
44. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2281 (2021).
45. Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91 (finding these justifications insufficient to warrant the indefinite
detention in the case).
46. Id. at 690; see also Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715, 738 (1972).
47. See Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690–91.
48. Id.
49. See id.
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preceding a final removal order so long as it mitigates flight risk and danger
to the community.50
Congress has authorized the use of immigration detention through three
separate statutes. Section 235 of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(“INA”) authorizes the detention of migrants subject to expedited removal.51
The statute authorizes the expedited removal of migrants without a hearing
or further review for anyone who (1) cannot demonstrate that they have been
physically present in the United States for two years immediately preceding
the encounter; and (2) is present without being formally admitted to the
United States, or presents themselves at the border and lacks authorization to
enter.52 Section 241 of the INA governs the detention of people with an
administratively final order of removal,53 including those who have departed
the United States after receiving a removal order and subsequently reentered
so that the prior removal order is reinstated.54 Our analysis focuses principally on the third detention statute: INA § 236. This law provides for discretionary detention under § 236(a) and mandatory detention under § 236(c)
during removal proceedings and pending a final decision on whether the person will be ordered removed.55
In 1996, Congress enacted a series of changes to the immigration laws that
made it more difficult for immigrants with any criminal history to remain in
the United States.56 At the same time, Congress expanded the grounds of
mandatory immigration detention.57 The changes to the mandatory detention
provision in § 236(c) increased the category of no-bond detention for persons
convicted of specific enumerated offenses to include minor misdemeanor
offenses alongside serious violent crimes.58 The justification for mandatory
detention was to incapacitate “dangerous” immigrants—who posed the greatest flight risk—to ensure their removal from the country as well as to protect
50. Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 527–28 (2003); Nielsen v. Preap, 139 S. Ct. 954, 960 (2019);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836, 848 (2018); Zadvydas, 533 U.S. at 690; Johnson v. Guzman
Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2281 (2021).
51. Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) § 235, 8 U.S.C § 1225.
52. INA § 235(b)(1)(A)(i), (iii)(II).
53. INA § 241. An order is administratively final typically upon dismissal of, waiver of, or expiration
of time allowed for an appeal. 8 C.F.R. § 1241.1 (2008). However, an order issued in absentia is final immediately upon issuance and an order certified to the BIA or AG is final upon a “subsequent decision
ordering removal.” Id.
54. INA § 241(a)(5); Johnson v. Guzman Chavez, 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2280 (2021).
55. INA § 236(a) (providing that the Attorney General may detain migrants during removal proceedings); INA § 236(c) (providing that the Attorney General shall detain certain categories of migrant pending a final order of removal).
56. See Jennifer M. Chacón, The 1996 Immigration Laws Come of Age, 9 DREXEL L. REV. 297, 298,
303 (2017) (discussing the goals and impacts of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant
Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”), the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act, and Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act); Nancy Morawetz, Understanding the Impact
of the 1996 Deportation Laws and the Limited Scope of Proposed Reforms, 113 HARV. L. REV. 1936,
1936 (2000).
57. See IIRIRA, Pub. L. No. 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009-546 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)).
58. INA § 236(c)(1) (citing to portions of INA §§ 212 and 237(a)(2), making certain crimes involving moral turpitude, aggravated felonies, controlled substances offenses, firearms offenses, and national
security offenses inadmissible or deportable offenses).
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public safety by preventing people with certain categories of criminal convictions from committing future crimes.59
Section 236(a) allows for discretionary detention and provides ICE with
three options: (1) to continue to detain the arrested migrant pending the removal proceedings; (2) to release the noncitizen on “bond of at least $1,500;”
or (3) to release the noncitizen on “conditional parole.”60 The regulations
implementing § 236(a) require a case-by-case determination based on
whether the individual poses a risk to public safety or risk of flight.61
Categorical detention is thus not permitted by statute or regulation for this
group of migrants.
People detained under § 236(a), with or without bond, can challenge their
detention and any accompanying bond amount set before an immigration
judge through a “custody redetermination” hearing.62 However, this process
is neither easy, quick, nor accurate in its current form.63 In contrast to pretrial
detention in the criminal setting wherein a bail hearing is held within fortyeight hours of detention,64 a custody redetermination hearing can take weeks
to schedule.65 Custody redetermination hearings also place the burden on the
migrant to prove that they are not a danger nor a risk of flight,66 though this
burden allocation has been successfully challenged in several courts.67
59. See Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 518–21 (2003).
60. INA § 236(a)(1), (2).
61. 8 C.F.R. § 1236.1(c)(8) (“[T]he alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such
release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future
proceeding.”).
62. 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.19(a), 1236.1(d); see also Matter of Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. 37, 40–41 (B.I.A.
2006) (finding the immigration judge appropriately considered evidence regarding public safety).
63. Class Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Class Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive
Relief at ¶ 5, Vazquez Perez v. Decker, 2019 WL 4784950 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (No. 18-cv-10683) [hereinafter Vazquez Perez Complaint] (alleging that ICE’s practice of waiting months before giving individuals
in an NYC detention facility an initial court appearance violates the U.S. Constitution and the
Administrative Procedure Act); COVID-19 Pandemic Drives Up Immigration Court Backlog and Delays,
TRAC IMMIGR.: WHAT’S NEW (Sept. 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/HLK4-SE2D (noting delays for bond
hearings in light of the COVID-19 pandemic); Adolfo Flores, ICE Detainees Were Held without Bond
Hearings for Months. Attorneys Worry It Will Get Worse, BUZZFEED NEWS (Feb. 13, 2020, 3:12 PM),
https://perma.cc/LQ46-K6Q7 (discussing a New Mexico detention center that held detainees for months
without a bond hearing, in part because bond hearings were “being deprioritized for other hearings”).
64. See, e.g., O’Donnell v. Harris County, 892 F.3d 147, 160 (5th Cir. 2018).
65. See Vazquez Perez Complaint, supra note 63, at ¶¶ 21, 28 (noting a median wait time of eighty
days for detainees in an NYC detention center to receive an initial hearing, when a detainee has the first
opportunity to be released on bond); Paul Moses & Tim Healy, Only 20% of ICE Detainees Get a
Hearing within 10 Days, DOCUMENTED (Dec. 20, 2020, 12:47 PM), https://perma.cc/R23J-S22H (noting
“eight courts in which it took EOIR longer than a median of 17 days to provide either a master calendar
hearing or bond determination”).
66. 8 C.F.R. § 236.1(c)(8) (“[T]he alien must demonstrate to the satisfaction of the officer that such
release would not pose a danger to property or persons, and that the alien is likely to appear for any future
proceeding.”); Guerra, 24 I. & N. Dec. at 40; Denise Gilman, To Loose the Bonds: The Deceptive
Promise of Freedom from Pretrial Immigration Detention, 92 IND. L.J. 157, 176–77 (2016).
67. See, e.g., Hernandez-Lara v. Lyons, 10 F.4th 19, 39 (1st Cir. 2021) (holding “that the government
must bear the burden of proving dangerousness or flight risk in order to continue detaining a noncitizen
under [INA § 236(a)]”); Velasco Lopez v. Decker, 978 F.3d 842, 846 (2d Cir. 2020) (affirming a district
court decision that placed the burden on the government); see also Mary Holper, The Beast of Burden in
Immigration Bond Hearings, 67 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 75, 117–22 (2016) (arguing that the government
should bear the burden).
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Additionally, the detained migrant is not guaranteed representation to help
marshal documents, witnesses, or arguments to prove that they should be
released, even if they are indigent.68 And because they are detained, the likelihood that they can secure legal counsel is extremely low.69 Unsurprisingly,
the rate of success at these hearings is also low.70
On the other hand, migrants who are subject to mandatory detention cannot
rely on any individualized review of their risk levels that would allow them
to be released.71 The legality of the statutes that mandate detention on entire
categories are tied to their nexus to risk. In upholding these statutes, the
Supreme Court has concluded that the categories of migrants encompassed
by those statutes are inherently riskier and, therefore, the statutes are sufficiently grounded in the acceptable justifications for immigration detention.72
Whether detained as a matter of discretion or by mandate, the harms
incurred to the people detained, their families, and their communities are substantial. A person waiting weeks to seek a bond from an immigration judge
faces the loss of their employment, their home, and long-lasting trauma stemming from family separation.73 In addition, detention itself imposes physical
and psychological harms on those incarcerated, including mental illness, exposure to debilitating diseases, and death.74
68. Immigration & Nationality Act § 240(b)(4)(A), 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(b)(4)(A) (giving noncitizens in
removal proceedings the right to representation, but only “at no expense to the Government”); see
Moncrieffe v. Holder, 569 U.S. 184, 201 (2013). But see Nicole Narea, New York Gave Every Detained
Immigrant a Lawyer. It Could Serve as a National Model, VOX (June 9, 2021, 8:00 AM), https://www.
vox.com/policy-and-politics/22463009/biden-new-york-immigrant-access-lawyer-court [archived at
https://perma.cc/2VLY-36LE] (describing New York’s recent initiative to provide publicly-funded
lawyers to all detained immigrants).
69. Ingrid V. Eagly & Steven Shafer, A National Study of Access to Counsel in Immigration Court,
164 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 32–36 (2015).
70. See Representation at Bond Hearings Rising but Outcomes Have Not Improved, TRAC IMMIGR.
(June 18, 2020), https://perma.cc/HG9V-YAPR; Immigration Court Bond Hearings and Related Case
Decisions, TRAC IMMIGR. (last updated Sept. 2021), https://perma.cc/4D7U-78EN (showing that
immigration judges granted bond in only 33 percent of cases in FY2021, down from 52 percent in
FY2020).
71. 8 U.S.C. § 1226(c)(1) (mandating detention for certain categories of offenses).
72. See Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836, 847 (2018); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 513,
519–21 (2003).
73. See SAMANTHA ARTIGA & BARBARA LYONS, KAISER FAM. FOUND., FAMILY CONSEQUENCES OF
DETENTION/DEPORTATION: EFFECTS ON FINANCES, HEALTH, AND WELL-BEING (2018), https://perma.cc/
E4DN-7DKG; CAITLIN PATLER, UCLA INST. FOR RSCH. ON LAB. & EMP., THE ECONOMIC IMPACTS OF
LONG-TERM IMMIGRATION DETENTION IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 2 (2015) (indicating “that long-term
detention produces financial insecurity at the individual and household levels, and removes millions of
dollars from local communities in the form of lost wages”).
74. See generally, e.g., OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-19-47,
CONCERNS ABOUT ICE DETAINEE TREATMENT AND CARE AT FOUR DETENTION FACILITIES 3 (2019)
(reporting findings of “unsafe and unhealthy conditions to varying degrees at all [four ICE] facilities”
inspected); US: Deaths in Immigration Detention: Newly Released Records Suggest Dangerous Lapses in
Medical Care, HUM. RTS. WATCH (July 7, 2016, 12:00 AM), https://perma.cc/2DUB-78QT (noting
“evidence of the misuse of isolation for people with mental disabilities, inadequate mental health
evaluation and treatment, and broader medical care failures” in detention facilities); Darius Tahir, ‘Black
Hole’ of Medical Records Contributes to Deaths, Mistreatment at the Border, POLITICO (Dec. 1, 2019, 6:
52 AM), https://perma.cc/GQ8Q-KUH2; Leigh Hopper, COVID-19, Suicide and Substandard Medical
Care Driving High Rate of Death Among ICE Detainees, USC NEWS (Jan. 21, 2021), https://perma.cc/
EGH5-J8U5; Fatma E. Marouf, Alternatives to Immigration Detention, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 2141, 2151–
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In sum, the stakes for people in immigration custody and their families are
high, and the protections are low. For people whose detention is congressionally mandated by § 236(c), the data from the RCA allow us to examine
whether the justifications for that statute bear out—whether the people falling
into this category are inherently more likely to abscond, more likely to endanger others, or both. For migrants who are detained as a matter of discretion
under § 236(a), the data from the RCA allow us to evaluate the degree and accuracy of individualized risk assessment used to determine whether to detain
or release each person. To fully understand the data from RCA, we must
examine how ICE officers and supervisors deploy the RCA in the course of
deciding whether to detain hundreds of thousands of people who pass through
their custody each year.
B.

The Operation of the RCA within the Immigration Detention System

In January 2013, DHS completed its national rollout of the RCA—the largest risk assessment tool in the country75—as part of its expanding detention
regime. The RCA would, in theory, measure a migrant’s flight risk and risk
to public safety in order to determine whether he or she should be detained by
ICE.76 The RCA consists of over 100 factors distributed across four modules:
special vulnerabilities, mandatory detention, public safety risk, and flight
risk.77 The mechanics of each of these modules are described in detail in Part
III, along with their results. In brief, the tool combines database records and
interview information in a scoring system to produce public safety and flight
risk assessments. These assessments are divided into “low,” “medium,” and
“high” categories based on the RCA’s scoring thresholds.78 The RCA then
combines the risk assessment level for public safety with the risk assessment
level for flight, along with special vulnerabilities and mandatory detention information, to generate a custody recommendation. The algorithm initially
53 (2017); Alyssa Aquino, ICE Must Test Migrants before Sending Them to Wash. Center, LAW360
(Aug. 24, 2021, 7:02 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1415863 [archived at https://perma.cc/
KSU8-6PLA] (reporting that ICE had failed to test detainees before transferring them, exposing
vulnerable detainees to COVID-19); Samantha Sherman, Defining Forced Labor: The Legal Battle to
Protect Detained Immigrants from Private Exploitation, 88 U. CHI. L. REV. 1201, 1203 (2021)
(mentioning reports of “abusive forced labor practices that not only violate fundamental principles of
human dignity but also pose serious dangers to [detainees’] mental and physical health and well-being”);
Immigration Detention and Covid-19, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Oct. 14, 2021), https://perma.cc/2GVXV6Z2 (documenting heightened and additional risks faced by detainees throughout the pandemic); HUM.
RTS. WATCH, AMERICAN CIV. LIBERTIES UNION, NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. & DET. WATCH
NETWORK, CODE RED: THE FATAL CONSEQUENCES OF DANGEROUSLY SUBSTANDARD MEDICAL CARE IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1 (2018), https://perma.cc/AD34-GGF6 (linking deaths in immigration
detention to “dangerously inadequate medical care”); Fraihat v. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 445 F.
Supp. 3d 709, 749–51 (C.D. Cal. 2020) (granting a preliminary injunction requiring ICE to make custody
redeterminations for detainees in light of its failed COVID-19 response).
75. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 51 n.32.
76. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., OIG-15-22, U.S. IMMIGRATION
AND CUSTOMS ENFORCEMENT’S ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION (REVISED) 4–5 (Feb. 4, 2015), https://
perma.cc/U73S-PT7B.
77. Id. at 5.
78. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).

14

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

produced one of four recommendations: (1) “detain in the custody of DHS”
(meaning without bond); (2) “detain, eligible for bond,” with a recommended
bond amount; (3) “supervisor to determine detain or release;” or (4) “release
under community supervision.”79 During the course of our study, the RCA’s
recommendations to “detain, eligible for bond” or “release under community
supervision” were eliminated.
The RCA’s labels are misleading in that the recommendation “detain, eligible for bond” does not correspond to the legal category of people statutorily
eligible for bond under § 236(a). Migrants whose detention is not mandatory
under § 236(a) could also receive the recommendation “detain in the custody
of DHS” based on their RCA scores. Thus, people who are eligible for bond
under § 236(a) fall into the both the “detain, eligible for bond” and “detain in
the custody of DHS” outcomes.80 For ease and to avoid the misleading label,
we refer to the RCA’s recommendations and ICE’s final custody decisions as
(1) detain, without bond; (2) detain, with bond; (3) supervisor to determine;
and (4) release.
While migrants may be arrested by ICE, they may also enter ICE custody
through an external office such as Customs and Border Patrol (“CBP”),
Homeland Security Investigations, or Criminal Alien Program officers in
state and federal prisons, or through state and local officers designated to
enforce immigration law under the 287(g) Program.81 The RCA is applied either by the external arresting agency or at the point of transfer to ICE custody.82 If external officers ran the RCA, then ICE officers review the RCA
summary along with other database entries upon booking the person into ICE
detention.83 During our study period, the only people exempt from the RCA
were those subject to mandatory detention who would also likely depart or be
removed from the United States within five days of the immigration arrest, or
people benefitting from an ICE decision to exercise its prosecutorial discretion and not initiate removal proceedings.84
Once the RCA produces a custody recommendation through its algorithm,
both the ICE officer and a supervisor must respond to the recommendation.85
The officer must specify if they agree with the RCA recommendation and
provide reasons for any disagreement.86 Then, an ICE supervisor must review
the RCA recommendation along with the ICE officer’s comments and make
79. See OFF. OF INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC., supra note 76, at 11, 25 (providing
data on the four recommendations).
80. See E-mail from ERO Taskings to Field Off. Dirs., Deputy Field Off. Dirs. and Assistant Field
Off. Dirs. (Jan. 6, 2014, 5:17 PM), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 1734–35 [hereinafter 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change].
81. U.S. IMMGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, RISK CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT (RCA) SYSTEMS TRAINING
98–111, 134–35 (unpublished training slides) (on file with Duke University), https://perma.cc/75TEQHPJ [hereinafter RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING].
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 802 n.57.
85. Id. at 805; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 81 at 136–44.
86. RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 81 at 136–44; Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 805.
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a final decision with respect to the person’s custody and any conditions for
detention or release.87
The RCA classifications, custody recommendation, and final supervisor
decisions, with any accompanying rationale, are placed in the detained person’s file.88 However, the RCA’s results are not shared with the migrant, their
attorney, or the immigration judge reviewing ICE’s custody determination, if
such a hearing is available.89 Thus, a direct challenge to the accuracy of the
RCA’s factors and scoring as applied to the migrant is not possible.
Through the RCA, DHS tried to quantify risk and justify immigration
detention. The tool emerged from efforts to control crime and limit detention
through assessing risk within the criminal justice system. In the next section,
we examine how the RCA emerged from the convergence of criminal and
immigration law and procedures. We explain how the use of risk tools and
the theory behind them become particularly distorted and damaging when
imported into the civil immigration enforcement regime.
C.

The Role of the RCA in the Crimmigration Narrative

The detention risk tool contributes to and is a product of the crime control
movement in criminal justice and crimmigration. Crimmigration is a term of
art coined by Professor Juliet Stumpf in 2006.90 The term describes an immigration law phenomenon that has criminalized immigration in a variety of
ways. The concept covers immigration consequences of criminal law (deportation for criminal acts); criminal consequences for immigration violations
(entering the country without documents); and applications of criminal law
enforcement resources and strategies to immigration enforcement.91 During
the past decade and a half, critical immigration scholars have examined this
interdisciplinary field of study through frames also referred to as new penologies and enemy penologies. Together, they subject facets of immigration
law and migration control to empirical and critical inquiry. For example,
scholars have used the concept as a frame for exploring both border control,

87.
88.

RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 81 at 136–44; Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 805.
U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, OFF. OF ENF’T & REMOVAL OPERATIONS, RISK
CLASSIFICATION ASSESSMENT (RCA) FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS (FAQ), VERSION 1 (revised July
2012), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 1328.
89. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 841.
90. We note that “crimmigration” is a controversial term. It is descriptive, reflecting the blurring of
criminal and civil law processes as applied to immigration law. It is prescriptive, embraced by critical immigration law scholars primed to hold the process to account to constitutional due process; it has also
been the basis for critical penology scholarship that subjects social and crime control techniques to critical
analysis. Additionally, and attracting controversy, the term has also been used to criminalize immigrants.
For more information on crimmigration, see Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants,
Crime, and Sovereign Power; 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367, 379–95 (2006); CÉSAR CUAUHTÉMOC GARCÍA
HERNÁNDEZ, MIGRATING TO PRISON: AMERICA’S OBSESSION WITH LOCKING UP IMMIGRANTS 22–39 (1st
ed. 2019); CRIMMIGRANT NATIONS: RESURGENT NATIONALISM AND THE CLOSING OF BORDERS 1–32
(Robert Koulish & Maartje van der Woude eds., 2020).
91. Stumpf, supra note 90, at 381–82.
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enforcement regimes,92 bordering processes,93 and the detention industry.94
Scholarship has pulled back the cover on immigration enforcement and
detention to reveal a huge carceral complex, with racism, abusive conditions,
and rogue enforcement as endemic features.95 Scholars have also positioned
the immigration carceral system within systems of privatization and a larger
political economy.96
Theories behind crimmigration scholarship evolved from and expanded on
crime control scholarship.97 With a focus on crime control rather than criminality, these critical scholars have analyzed the war on crime in terms of an
industrial complex,98 racism,99 “culture of crime,”100 “governing through
crime,”101 and crime-based rationality.102 Each of these approaches describes
a new paradigm for governing through crime to exact violence on people of
color and reinforce white power elites. Crime control burst onto the scene in
the 1980s, with President Reagan’s twin wars on drugs and crime.103 Urban
areas adapted these federal initiatives for zero tolerance policing, including

92. Stumpf, supra note 90, at 386–90; Jennifer M. Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime,
109 COLUM. L. REV. SIDEBAR 135, 142–43 (2009).
93. NIRA YUVAL-DAVIS, GEORGIE WEMYSS & KATHRYN CASSIDY, BORDERING 1–28 (2019).
94. Hernández, supra note 27, at 1360–82 (tracing the origins of mass detention as entangled with
the War on Drugs and explaining Congress’s punitive intent in passing immigration legislation); Stephen
H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law: Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms,
64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469, 489–94 (2007).
95. See, e.g., supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text; Danielle C. Jefferis, Constitutionally
Unaccountable: Privatized Immigration Detention, 95 IND. L.J. 145, 173–74 (2020); Peter K. Enns &
Mark D. Ramirez, Privatizing Punishment: Testing Theories of Public Support for Private Prison and
Immigration Detention Facilities, 56 CRIMINOLOGY 546, 550–51 (2018) (describing the “racial animus”
theory of support for privatized detention).
96. HERNÁNDEZ, supra note 90, see ch. 3– 4; ALINA DAS, NO JUSTICE IN THE SHADOWS: HOW
AMERICA CRIMINALIZES IMMIGRANTS 11–27 (2020); TODD MILLER, EMPIRE OF BORDERS: THE
EXPANSION OF THE U.S. BORDER AROUND THE WORLD (2019).
97. Jonathan Simon draws comparisons between immigrants and crime and detention in Jonathan
Simon, Refugees in a Carceral Age: The Rebirth of Immigration Prisons in the United States, 10 PUB.
CULTURE 577 (1998). For an introduction to the framing of crime control, see generally DAVID GARLAND,
THE CULTURE OF CONTROL: CRIME AND SOCIAL ORDER IN CONTEMPORARY SOCIETY, ch. 5 (2001). For an
understanding of the governing through crime concept, see generally JONATHAN SIMON, GOVERNING
THROUGH CRIME: HOW THE WAR ON CRIME TRANSFORMED AMERICAN DEMOCRACY AND CREATED A
CULTURE OF FEAR, ch. 9 (2007).
98. See, e.g., Globalism and the Prison Industrial Complex: An Interview with Angela Davis, 40
RACE & CLASS 145, 145–46 (1999).
99. See generally MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE
OF COLOR BLINDNESS (2010); Loı̈c Wacquant, From Slavery to Mass Incarceration: Rethinking the ‘Race
Question’ in the US, 13 NEW LEFT REV. 41, 41 (2002) (arguing “that slavery and mass imprisonment are
genealogically linked”).
100. David Garland’s culture of crime analyzes crime through the lens of victims, for example laws
being named after crime victims, like Megan’s Law. See David Garland, The Culture of High Crime
Societies: Some Preconditions of Recent ‘Law and Order’ Policies, 40 BRIT. J. CRIMINOLOGY 347, 351
(2000).
101. Jonathan Simon shows that the War on Crime has shifted the paradigm in law and society to tie
nearly every social problem into a problem of crime. See SIMON, supra note 97, at 3–5.
102. Jonathan Simon examines social policy through the lens of crime. To Simon, zero-tolerance
policies such as broken windows are rationalities of governing through crime. See id.
103. Michael Tonry, Racial Politics, Racial Disparities and the War on Crime, 40 CRIME &
DELINQUENCY (1994).
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the now discredited “broken windows” thesis,104 which nonetheless
unleashed aggressive policing targeted at communities of color and nonviolent offenses in particular.105 Early initiatives like “broken windows” inspired
a generation of crime control techniques designed to preempt crime.106
Techniques included stop and frisk, racial profiling, and mass incarceration
of Black and Brown men across the country.107 Crimmigration scholarship
surfaced to examine how ostensibly discredited crime control techniques
found their way to migration control.108 As much as crimmigration scholarship explains how policing techniques apply to immigration control, the new
penology subfield followed a more direct line from crime control scholarship
to explain why these control strategies have prevailed.109 The RCA is both a
product of and contributor to these frameworks.
Risk classifications has been around criminal justice for much of the 20th
century, but it was not until the 1990s that technological advances made it
possible to enhance objectivity and efficiency. Risk theory in the 1990s introduced a new frame for understanding social phenomena and was perceived
as a particularly effective method of assessment and reform in criminal justice.110 Scholars applying risk theory to crime control made the bold claim
that risk would encompass a new era of policing.111
Although claims to a paradigm shift in policing through risk have been
weakened by reality over time,112 the new frame was useful for identifying
social problems through a science of surveillance and prediction, and then
addressing them through preemptive strategies for identifying, mitigating, or
managing risk. The “risk principle” is a particularly useful heuristic to
104. William J. Bratton, The New York City Police Department’s Civil Enforcement of Quality-ofLife Crimes, 3 J.L. & POL’Y 447, 448 (1995); Debra Livingston, Police Discretion and the Quality of Life
in Public Places: Courts, Communities, and the New Policing, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 551, 578–79 (1997).
105. Andrea McArdle, Introduction to ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW POLICE
BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY 2–12 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 2001) (critically analyzing
“Policing the Quality of Life”); Bratton, supra note 104, at 448; Livingston, supra note 104, at 579.
106. K. Babe Howell, Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive OrderMaintenance Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271 (2009).
107. See, e.g., Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York
City and a Five-City Social Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271, 286 (2006); Jeffrey Fagan, Amanda
Geller, Garth Davies & Valerie West, Street Stops and Broken Windows Revisited: The Demography and
Logic of Proactive Policing in a Safe and Changing City 1–8 (Colum. L. Sch. Pub. L. & Legal Theory
Working Paper Grp., Paper No. 09-203, 2009); CRIME, RISK AND JUSTICE: THE POLITICS OF CRIME
CONTROL IN LIBERAL DEMOCRACIES 22 (Kevin Stenson & Robert R. Sullivan eds., 2001).
108. See generally Stumpf, supra note 90; KATJA FRANKO, THE CRIMMIGRANT OTHER: MIGRATION
AND PENAL POWER 24, 28, 31, 44 (2019).
109. Leanne Weber & Jude McCulloch, Penal Power and Border Control: Which Thesis?
Sovereignty, Governmentality, or the Pre-emptive State?, 21 PUNISHMENT & SOC’Y 496, 498–99 (2019).
110. See STANDARDS FOR CRIM. JUST.: PRETRIAL RELEASE § 10-1.10 (AM. BAR ASS’N 2007);
Christopher T. Lowenkamp & Jay Whetzel, The Development of an Actuarial Risk Assessment
Instrument for U.S. Pretrial Services, 73 FED. PROBATION 33, 33 (2009).
111. Malcolm M. Feeley & Jonathan Simon, The New Penology: Notes on the Emerging Strategy of
Corrections and Its Implications, 30 CRIMINOLOGY 449, 450 (1992); Pat O’Malley, Experiments in Risk
and Criminal Justice, 12 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 451, 452–57 (2008).
112. Tim Owen, Culture of Crime Control Through a Post-Foucauldian Lens, INTERNET J.
CRIMINOLOGY, 1 (2007); KEVIN STENSON, The New Politics of Crime Control, in CRIME, RISK AND
JUSTICE, 15-28 (2000).
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describe the projected relationship between detention and recidivism.113
The concept connects detention to risk or dangerousness, not punishment
or deterrence. The first wave of studies about risk classification assessment
reinforced claims to objective decision-making in pretrial detention,114 sentencing,115 and parole116 decisions. Scholars showed that risk tools lowered
detention rates and kept low-risk defendants out of jail or prison when appropriately applied.117 The key finding for criminal justice was that using risk
tools led to lower recidivism.118
Risk assessment tools are most prevalent in criminal pretrial detention.119
Their purpose is to impose the appropriate amount of restraint on criminal
defendants to lower recidivism.120 Risk tools, described as “a journey to ever
increasing accuracy and reliability,”121 endeavor to achieve a Goldilocksand-the-Three-Bears scenario where those with “low” risk avoid detention
(to detain low risk is to invite higher recidivism rates, as detainees hardened
by detention are more likely to recidivate) and those with “high” risk are
detained (to release them similarly invites re-offending). This scenario places
the most attention on mid-level risk and bond eligibility schemes designed to
lower recidivism.
Measuring risk first took hold in pretrial detention in the 1960s as part of
New York City’s Manhattan Bail Project, a Vera Project Initiative that
showed people accused of committing a crime can be relied on to appear in
court.122 An increase in the prevalence of risk in pretrial detention followed
the 1984 Bail Reform Act.123 Now, forty-eight states and Washington, D.C.

113. See Christopher T. Lowenkamp, Edward J. Latessa & Alexander M. Holsinger, The Risk
Principle in Action: What Have We Learned From 13,673 Offenders and 97 Correctional Programs?, 52
CRIME & DELINQUENCY 77, 89–90 (2006).
114. Anne Milgram, Alexander M. Holsinger, Marie VanNostrand & Matthew W. Alsdorf, Pretrial
Risk Assessment: Improving Public Safety and Fairness in Pretrial Decision Making, 27 FED. SENT’G
REP. 216, 217–19 (2015).
115. See generally Christopher Slobogin, Principles of Risk Assessment: Sentencing and Policing,
15 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 583 (2018).
116. See generally ROGER HOOD & STEPHEN SHUTE, THE PAROLE SYSTEM AT WORK: A STUDY OF
RISK BASED DECISION-MAKING (2000).
117. Milgram, Holsinger, VanNostranf & Alsdorf, supra note 114, at 220.
118. Shima Baradaran, Opinion, The Right Way to Shrink Prisons, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2011),
https://perma.cc/997B-FQYJ.
119. Risk tools have also been popular decision-making guides for post-conviction incarceration and
release from custody. See Jodi L. Viljoen, Melissa R. Jonnson, Dana M. Cochrane, Lee M. Vargen &
Gina M. Vincent, Impact of Risk Assessment Instruments on Rates of Pretrial Detention, Postconviction
Placements, and Release: A Systemic Review and Meta-Analysis, 43 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 397, 397–98
(2019).
120. See Baradaran, supra note 118; Shima Baradaran, Restoring the Presumption of Innocence, 72
OHIO ST. L.J. 723, 771–72 (2011).
121. Hazel Kemshall, Crime and Risk, in RISK IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 76, 82 (Peter Taylor-Gooby &
Jens O. Zinn eds., 2006) (referencing James Bonta, Risk-Needs Assessment and Treatment, in CHOOSING
CORRECTIONAL OPTIONS THAT WORK: DEFINING THE DEMAND AND EVALUATING THE SUPPLY 18 (Alan
T. Harland ed., 1996)).
122. Charles E. Ares, Anne Rankin & Herbert Sturz, The Manhattan Bail Project: An Interim Report
on the Use of Pre-Trial Parole, 38 N.Y.U. L. REV. 67 (1963).
123. Jerome E McElroy, Introduction to the Manhattan Bail Project, 24 FED. SENTENCING
REPORTER 8, 8–9 (2011).
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have had laws permitting courts to consider risk to public safety in pretrial
detention and bail hearings.124 Although risk tools assess risk for both flight
and public safety, research attaching risk to recidivism focuses on public
safety.125 Scholars examining risk assessment in pretrial detention have
shown its effectiveness in decreasing recidivism.126 An effective risk tool
would see reductions in incarceration without increasing recidivism.127
Further, the risk tool can actually bring about decreases in re-offending by
keeping high-risk offenders in jail.128 Conversely, keeping low risk offenders
out of jail and on supervised release is beneficial to the offender and society.129 Risk assessment arrived at ICE at the behest of Dr. Dora Schriro, the
former head of Corrections for the State of Arizona. Schriro envisioned risk
in immigration detention as providing a cleaner selection system devoted to
the detention of high-risk immigrants while lowering the detention overall.130
In Arizona, she had made broad use of the criminal risk tool with the intention of lowering recidivism and measuring success in terms of lowered recidivism rates.131
In 2009, Schriro launched a nationwide investigation of immigration
facilities for DHS.132 At the time, the Obama administration attempted to
confront a growing crisis of immigration detention. Mass incarceration was
the predictable outcome of legislatively mandating detention and increased
funding for an enforcement agency that prioritized holding migrants in custody. It came as no real surprise to see detentions jump from 20,000 daily,
and about 204,000 annually in 2001133 to 32,100 daily and 383,000 annually
in 2009.134

124. Shima Baradaran & Frank L. McIntyre, Predicting Violence, 90 TEX. L. REV. 497, 507 (2012).
125. E.g., John Monahan & Jennifer L. Skeem, Risk Assessment in Criminal Sentencing, 12 ANN.
REV. CLINICAL PSYCH. 489, 494 (2016).
126. NANCY LAVIGNE, SAMUEL BIELER, LINDSEY CRAMER, HELEN HO, CYBELE KOTANIAS,
DEBORAH MAYER, DAVID MCCLURE, LAURA PACIFICI, ERIKA PARKS, BRYCE PETERSON & JULIE
SAMUELS, URB. INST., JUSTICE REINVESTMENT INITIATIVE STATE ASSESSMENT REPORT 5 (2014); Edward
J. Latessa & Christopher Lowenkamp, What Works in Reducing Recidivism?, 3 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 521,
522 (2006).
127. PAMELA M. CASEY, ROGER K. WARREN & JENNIFER K. ELEK, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE CTS.,
USING OFFENDER RISK AND NEEDS ASSESSMENT INFORMATION AT SENTENCING: GUIDANCE FOR COURTS
FROM A NATIONAL WORKING GROUP 8–9 (2011).
128. Edward J. Latessa, Richard Lemke, Matthew Markarios, Paul Smith, Christopher T.
Lowenkamp, The Creation and Validation of the Ohio Risk Assessment System (ORAS), 74 FED.
PROBATION, 1 (2010); Sarah L. Desmarais, Kiersten L. Johnson, Jay P. Singh, Performance of Recidivism
Risk Assessment Instruments in U.S. Correctional Settings, 13 PSYCH. SERVS. 206, 206–22 (2016).
129. See, e.g., James Austin, The Proper and Improper Use of Risk Assessment in Corrections, 16
FED. SENT’G REP. 194, 196 (2004); Viljoen, Jonnson, Cochrane, Vargen & Vincent, supra note 119, at
398.
130. See DORA SCHRIRO, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T, IMMIGRATION DETENTION OVERVIEW
AND RECOMMENDATIONS 3 (2009).
131. See Dora Schriro, Getting Ready: How Arizona Has Created a ‘Parallel Universe’ for Inmates,
NAT’L INST. JUST. (June 14, 2009), https://perma.cc/4MVE-RNJA.
132. SCHRIRO, supra note 130, at 2.
133. Emily Kassie, Detained, MARSHALL PROJECT (Sept. 24, 2019, 1:30 AM), https://www.
themarshallproject.org/2019/09/24/detained [archived at https://perma.cc/W8LS-J8ZC].
134. Id.
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The private prison industry was driver in mass detention. It was a formidable backer of pro detention candidates to Congress, had even less accountability than government facilities, and as a result oversaw watered down
safety measures. Conditions predictably worsened, becoming increasingly
unsafe,135 with frequent accounts of physical and sexual abuse,136 and inadequate access to health services,137and medical care.138 By 2009, congressional hearings highlighting these matters139 piqued alarm bells inside the
new Obama administration.140
The Schriro Report, issued in late 2009,141 was a response to the growing
crisis. It provided a devastating critique of the existing detention system, documenting the growth of detention without using basic tools for measuring
performance.142 In theory, ICE was supposed to detain individuals rated a
high-risk and release lower-risk individuals.143 But no protocol existed for
measuring the risk to flight or public safety.144 The Report recommended the
adoption of electronic alternatives to detention (“ATDs”) and a risk tool as
means to tamp down on the detention of non-criminals.145 Detention could
adversely affect low-risk migrants146 and re-traumatize victims of persecution.147 Scholars concurred an objective risk tool would not recommend
135. See generally Hauwa Ahmed, How Private Prisons Are Profiting Under the Trump
Administration, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Aug. 30, 2019), https://perma.cc/KC8E-6XE9; Monsy
Alvardo, Ashley Balcerzak, Stacey Barchenger, Jon Campbell, Rafael Carranza, Maria Clark, Alan
Gomez, Daniel Gonzalez, Trevor Hughes, Rick Jervis, Dan Keemahill, Rebecca Plevin, Jeremy
Schwartz, Sarah Taddeo, Lauren Villagran, Dennis Wagner, Elizabeth Weise, Alissa Zhu,‘These People
Are Profitable’: Under Trump, Private Prisons Are Cashing in on ICE Detainees, USA TODAY (Apr. 23,
2020, 12:25 PM), https://perma.cc/PU7K-6974.
136. HUM. RTS. WATCH, DETAINED AND AT RISK: SEXUAL ABUSE AND HARASSMENT IN UNITED
STATES IMMIGRATION DETENTION 1–2 (2010).
137. See, e.g., Geoffrey Heeren, Pulling Teeth: The State of Mandatory Immigration Detention, 45
HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 601, 614–18 (2010).
138. See ALISON SISKIN, CONG. RSCH. SERV., RL34556, HEALTH CARE FOR NONCITIZENS IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION 10–12 (2009). See also Nina Bernstein, The Impact of Investigative Journalism
on U.S. Immigration Detention Reform 8 (Glob. Det. Project, Working Paper No. 13, 2016).
139. See, e.g., SISKIN, supra note 138, at 10.
140. Nina Bernstein, U.S. to Reform Policy on Detention for Immigrants, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 5, 2009),
https://perma.cc/V74L-74U2.
141. See generally, SCHRIRO, supra note 130.
142. Specifically, Dr. Schriro reported that the facilities and operational standards used to detain
immigrants are stunningly similar to—and in fact originally designed for—criminal incarceration. Id.
This in turn results in a system that is far more expensive and punitive than necessary to safely manage
the vast majority of immigrant detainees. Id. at 2–3. One of her key recommendations was for ICE to create risk assessments that would allow it to tailor detention and supervision standards that aligned with
individual risk levels. See id. at 3. The report is also notable for its strong recommendation that ATDs be
expanded and further utilized in immigration enforcement. Id. at 18–21.
143. Nina Bernstein, Report Critical of Scope of Immigration Detention, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 6, 2009),
https://perma.cc/46ZJ-72Q4.
144. Id.
145. See SCHRIRO, supra note 130, at 3 (recommending a system “with the requisite management
tools and informational systems to detain and supervise aliens in a setting consistent with assessed
risk”).
146. Milgram, Holsinger, VanNostranf & Alsdorf, supra note 114, at 219; Christopher T.
Lowenkamp & Edward J. Latessa, Understanding the Risk Principle: How and Why Correctional
Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, 2004 TOPICS IN CMTY. CORRECTIONS 3, 5–8.
147. Br. in Supp. of Pet’rs-Appellees by Amici Curiae: Scholars and Researchers in Sociology,
Criminology, Anthropology, Psychology, Geography, Public Health, Medicine, Latin American Studies,
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detention for such individuals.148 A risk tool could incorporate industry standards that are “objectively knowable and amenable to probabilistic calculation.”149 By using a standardized algorithm, low-risk migrants would be
released, while those with high risks would be detained.150
The RCA’s business rules, FAQs, and instructions articulated these desired
outcomes. The risk tool borrowed actuarial risk techniques from “current
industry standard risk assessment techniques”151 and the automated scoring
system (the algorithm) would guide decision-making based on flight risk,
public safety, and an individual’s special vulnerabilities.152 Overall detention
rates would decrease, and ICE would showcase a cleaner detention process
using risk methods from criminal justice to “provid[e] better transparency,
standardization, and reporting on key custody, custody classification level,
and community supervision level decisions made daily by ICE agents and
officers.”153 In theory, ICE would detain dangerous migrants or people at
high risk of flight. ICE was not supposed to detain low-risk migrants or people with special vulnerabilities.154
As we describe in Part III, the reality was quite the opposite. Problems
arose almost immediately because of the architecture of the RCA. A criminal
justice risk tool is misaligned for immigration enforcement. Risk tools used
in pretrial detention are designed to lower recidivism among criminal
offenders. The RCA imported the criminal risk tool’s focus on past criminal
offenses, their severity, and how long ago the crimes were committed. But,
unlike with criminal pretrial detention risk tools, the performance of the RCA

and Law, Whose Work Relates to Incarceration and Detention, Migrant Populations, and the Effect of
U.S. Immigration Detention and Removal Policies on Migrant Populations 16–17, Robbins v. Rodriguez,
804 F.3d 1060 (9th Cir. 2015) (Nos. 13-56706 & 13-56755) [hereinafter Rabin Amicus Brief]; Marouf,
supra note 74, at 2151.
148. SCHRIRO, supra note 130, at 6.
149. Hazel Kemshall, Louise Marsland, Thilo Boeck & Leigh Dunkerton, Young People, Pathways
and Crime: Beyond Risk Factors, 39 AUSTL. & N.Z. J. CRIMINOLOGY 354, 355 (2006).
150. It should be noted that alternatives to detention had been discussed and studied a decade earlier
during the Clinton Administration’s collaboration with the Vera Institute. See generally VERA INST. OF
JUST., COMMUNITY SUPERVISION PROVES DETENTION IS UNNECESSARY TO ENSURE APPEARANCE T
IMMIGRATION HEARINGS (2020).
151. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) in EARM 5.3 Quick
Reference Guide (2013), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 1739 [hereinafter RCA
Quick Reference Guide].
152. RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 81, at 794.
153. Id. at 4.
154. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees Bi-National
Roundtable on Alternatives to Detention: Buffalo, N.Y. & Fort Erie, Ontario (Sept. 25, 2012), in
CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 23 [hereinafter UNHCR Roundtable]; Memorandum
from ERO Taskings on behalf of Gary Mead, Exec. Assoc. Dir., to All ERO Employees (Aug. 15, 2012,
4:43 PM), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 43 (explaining changes to the RCA
Scoring Methodology); RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules); INTERAM. COMM’N ON HUM. RTS., REPORT ON IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES: DETENTION AND DUE
PROCESS 8–9 (2010), https://perma.cc/3HMH-3QUB; Written Testimony of Immigration and Customs
Enforcement (ICE) Director John Morton for a House Committee on Appropriations, Subcommittee on
Homeland Security Hearing on the President’s Fiscal Year 2013 Budget Request for ICE, U.S. DEP’T OF
HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 8, 2012), https://perma.cc/MG4W-285W.
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was never measured against criminal recidivism rates.155 Migrants were simply doubly punished for any criminal history. Additionally, the Obama
administration deployed detention to combat unauthorized entry and reentry
through its flight risk assessment.156 Indeed, by 2015, the RCA was marking
(almost) every person crossing the border as “high” risk and detaining them
without bond.157 Again, the RCA’s flight risk rubric was never externally
validated. Performance indicators were instead circular: the tool performed
well to the extent that the RCA’s custody recommendations aligned with the
final decisions by detention officers.
By the end of the Obama administration, a total of 3,181,867 migrants had
been branded as risky and detained based on the likelihood they presented
flight or public safety risks, at a cost to the public of $14.5 billion dollars
between 2010 and 2016.158
The Trump administration’s approach to migration control was zero tolerance. It promoted the convergence of the criminal and the immigrant. For former President Trump, the “illegal alien”159 was as much a threat to law and
order as the rapist or murderer.160 The Trump administration’s zero tolerance
enforcement policies for example, failed to distinguish low grade immigration violations from rape and murder in enforcement priorities.161 In fact,
zero tolerance enforcement incentivized officers to pick the low hanging
fruit: the low-level offenders.162 The Trump administration deployed the
RCA accordingly and eliminated the recommendation of release for any migrant, regardless of risk.163
Though conceived as an antidote to widespread civil detention of mostly
Black and Brown migrants, the RCA quickly became a tool to expand immigration incarceration. It introduced new technologies to the growing immigration control regime and brought preemptive enforcement strategies to
bear on migrant controls. The RCA thus provided an avenue to apply “broken
155. 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 8, at 1734–35 (explaining that scoring
changes were intended to “strengthen alignment both with ICE priorities and with the actual Detain/
Release decisions currently being generated by ERO RCA end users”).
156. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Off. of Enf’t & Removal Operations, RCA Executive Action
Scoring Updates Guide (Feb. 2015), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 1798 [hereinafter Executive Action Scoring Guide].
157. See infra Part III (Period 3).
158. Kassie, supra note 133.
159. See Aaron Blake, Trump Seeks to Resurrect a Long-Dormant Phrase: ‘Illegal Alien,’ WASH.
POST (Jan. 14, 2019), https://perma.cc/SL7S-ZNXF (noting President Donald Trump’s efforts in repopularizing the antiquated and offensive term).
160. See Jacqueline Thomsen, Trump on Criticizing Mexican Immigrants: ‘Peanuts’ Compared to
the Truth, HILL (Aug. 2, 2018, 8:26 PM), https://perma.cc/LM35-B7K4 (describing Trump’s repeated
characterizations of undocumented people as violent criminals).
161. WILLIAM A. KANDEL, CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45266, THE TRUMP ADMINISTRATION’S “ZERO
TOLERANCE” IMMIGRATION ENFORCEMENT POLICY 1 (2018) (“Under the zero tolerance policy, DOJ prosecuted all adult aliens apprehended crossing the border illegally, with no exception . . . .”).
162. Emma Whitford, NYC’s Broken Windows Reform Is Too Weak, Critics Say, GOTHAMIST (Jan.
26, 2016, 4:55 PM), https://perma.cc/8FWR-CNUG.
163. Mica Rosenberg & Reade Levinson, Trump’s Catch-and-Detain Policy Snares Many Who
Have Long Called U.S. Home, REUTERS (June 20, 2018, 3:18 PM), https://perma.cc/LJ3P-FUJN.
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windows” policing to immigration enforcement through the use of a tool for
the pursuit and detention of migrants with almost any criminal history and
low-grade offenders, with people who entered without inspection as quintessential low hanging fruit. The RCA became a vehicle for incapacitating lowrisk migrants on the theory that detention would reduce unauthorized migration as a whole.164
Risk assessment promised a new purpose and method of detention that
ensures detention’s connection with its permissible use in the civil law framework. In practice, the RCA transplanted a pre-emptive crime control
approach onto immigration enforcement and analogized the migrant to the
criminal, turning human beings into crimmigrants.165 The RCA is at once
emblematic of the convergence of criminal and immigration law and procedures and the failures that result. Our study subjects risk assessment within
the immigration enforcement system to critical inquiry, examining its problems in design and application. The next section describes the data on which
we based our study, followed by a discussion of our results.
II.

DATA AND METHODOLOGY: ICE DETENTION DECISIONS IN THREE DATASETS

This Article introduces data derived from three datasets pursuant to a variety of Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”) requests and subsequent litigation, described in detail in our previous work.166 Extracting information
about the RCA’s scale and methodology required extensive FOIA requests,
several rounds of administrative appeals, federal district court litigation, and
a protracted settlement agreement, all of which took more than six years. The
process began in 2011, as the RCA was piloted in ICE’s Baltimore and
Washington field offices.167 Author Robert Koulish and Mark Noferi filed
FOIA requests for the results of the new RCA system in these two locations.168 DHS initially released several batches of RCA detailed summaries
164. See, e.g., Muneeba Talukder, ICE Uses the Failed ‘Broken Windows’ Mentality, with Deadly
Consequences, ACLU PA. (June 12, 2020, 9:30 AM), https://perma.cc/MG6X-SFGQ; Max RivlinNadler, How Broken Windows Policing Breaks NYC’s Immigrant Sanctuaries, VILL. VOICE (Dec. 13,
2016), https://perma.cc/8TQX-X6M6.
165. See Katja Franko Aas, ‘Crimmigrant’ Bodies and Bona Fide Travelers: Surveillance,
Citizenship and Global Governance, 15 THEORETICAL CRIMINOLOGY 331, 335 (2011); FRANKO, supra
note 108, at 21–52 (describing the othering of immigrants by perpetuating the falsehood that they are
more likely to be criminals); ROBERT KOULISH & ERNESTO CALVO, DETAINING IMMIGRANTS, SCORING
CRIMINALS: HOW SCORING ALGORITHMS TRANSFORMED ANTI-IMMIGRANT SENTIMENTS INTO POLICY
(forthcoming 2021) (manuscript at ch. 3).
166. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 796–800. Frank Pasquale introduced algorithmic fairness as a
topic for scholarship, suggesting that accuracy, reliability, and fairness in algorithms are mitigated by the
“black box society.” PASQUALE, supra note 19, at 4. The effort to eliminate discrimination may be impossible as long as algorithms remain opaque. The immigration algorithm is an example of a secret algorithm
that failed as a result.
167. U.S. Gov’t Accountability Off., GAO (441213), ICE Alternatives to Detention: Questions
Regarding the Risk Classification Assessment, in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 33.
168. These FOIA requests are on file with author Robert Koulish. See also Robert Koulish, Using
Risk to Assess the Legal Violence of Mandatory Detention, 5 LAWS 1, 8 n.29 (2016) (“ICE provided 505
RCA Detailed Summaries to the authors through a non-adversarial FOIA process, in a series of four productions from September 2013 to June 2014. All were from ICE’s Baltimore Field Office (which spans
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in the form of a one- or two-page printout of the RCA outcome for each migrant. These summaries showed that the RCA was comprised of separate
modules that assess a migrant’s flight risk and risk to public safety as well as
whether the individual has a “special vulnerability” or is subject to mandatory
detention. The summaries also revealed that the RCA combined the results of
each module in some way to produce an overall recommendation regarding
whether to detain the migrant, to set a bond, and if so, for what amount. To
address the core question of how DHS decides who to detain, the authors submitted five separate FOIA requests in the fall of 2014, targeting the different
components of the RCA system as well as data on its results nationwide.169
Pro bono counsel for the authors170 perfected all administrative appeals, sued
in federal district court, and negotiated a stipulated settlement requiring DHS
to produce a wide array of documents and data.171 The results of the FOIA
requests are available through an electronic repository.172
The first dataset is derived from a file containing 1.4 million cases nationwide analyzed by the RCA from 2012 to 2016, cleaned and limited to immigration detention and release decisions (N=454,891). This dataset includes a
summary of the RCAs with a limited set of variables available. To produce
this dataset, we began with 1,439,792 records. These cases were distributed
across three different RCA processes: Custody Classification, with 667,531
cases that represented 46.36 percent of the total; Detain/Release, with
744,474 cases that represented 51.71 percent of the total; and Community
Supervision, with 26,888 cases that represented 1.87 percent of the total.
There were 899 cases with missing values for this variable, which represented less than 1 percent of the total. Once we started with the preliminary
analyses of the data, we realized that some of the entries were empty or missing key fields. Accordingly, we removed all the cases that were missing the
variables “RCA Decision Type,” “Risk to Public Safety,” and “Risk of
Flight.” Once those missing cases were removed, we ended up with approximately 86 percent of the original cases. We also identified duplicate entries in
which all thirty-one variables were identical.173 Once duplicate entries were
eliminated, we ended up with a grand total of 902,139 cases, losing almost 20
percent of the original entries. We also discarded entries that contained an invalid or an “out of place” value on the RCA Recommendation for the Detain/
Release process. Once we isolated Detain/Release cases from the other RCA
the state of Maryland), in four batches labeled ‘March 2013’, ‘April 2013’, ‘May 2013’, and ‘June 2013’
(ICE represented that the last batch was incomplete).”).
169. The electronic repository includes copies of all of the initial FOIA requests. See CONSOLIDATED
FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8. The FOIA requests were submitted jointly by Kate Evans, Robert
Koulish, Mark Noferi, Ben Casper Sanchez, and Linus Chan. The requestors then became joint plaintiffs
in the subsequent FOIA litigation in the U.S. District Court for the District of Minnesota.
170. Attorneys Shannon L. Bjorklund, Colin Wicker, Michelle Grant, and Emily Mawer from
Dorsey & Whitney LLP assisted with the authors’ administrative and judicial challenges.
171. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at app.; CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8.
172. See CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8.
173. The variables list can be made available by the authors upon request.

2021]

PUNISHING WITH IMPUNITY

25

processes, we arrived at about 454,891 cases. It is important to highlight that
we refer to cases, records, or entries using a data analysis nomenclature
because we are not able to identify individual people per se. The detain/
release cases had the following characteristics:
RCA Risk Levels:
�
�

Risk of Flight: High 48.8%; Medium 21.2%; Low 30%
Risk to Public Safety: High 38.1%; Medium 34.5%; Low 27.4%

Custody: 92% Detained (with or without bond); 8% Released
�
�
�

Detained, without bond: 80.9%
Detain, with bond: 11%
Released on Community Supervision: 8.2%

Bond (75,051 cases assigned bonds)
� $1,500–$300,000 (11 cases assigned a bond greater than $500,000
were eliminated as outliers)
� Mean bond amount: $8,852
Special Vulnerabilities (27,567 cases)
�
�
�

Detained, without bond: 56.0%
Detained, with bond: 6.5%
Release on Community Supervision: 37.5%

The second dataset consists of a random sample: 2,500 of the 1.4 million
cases from the first dataset minus the cases with incomplete information, to
give us N=2,411. This subset also covers cases nationwide from 2012 to
2016. It includes the detailed summaries of the RCAs with all of the factors
scored and analyzed by the algorithm. The randomly selected sample in this
dataset has the following characteristics:
Demographics:
An average age of 33.5 years, with ages ranging from 2 to 77 years old.
On average, males were 34, and females were 31.
82% (1976 out of 2404) of individuals were male, and 17.4% (419)
were female.
� One-half were from Central America, 37% were citizens of the
Northern Triangle, and one-third were citizens of Mexico.
�
�
�

RCA Risk Levels:
�
�

Risk of Flight: High 68.2%; Medium 15.6%; Low 16.1%
Risk to Public Safety:High 21.7%; Medium 23.6%; Low 54.6%

Custody: 95% Detained (with or without bond); 5% Released
�

Detained, without bond: 86.9%
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Detained, with bond: 7.5%
Released: 5.4%

These rates of detention are slightly above the national rate. DHS reported
that nationally between July 30, 2012 and December 31, 2013, for example,
ICE detained 91.4 percent of those people upon whom ICE conducted RCA—
most without bond (78.1 percent).174
The third dataset is for the New York City Area of Operations from 2013
to 2019, consisting of 19,891 cases. The New York City Area of Operation
includes the five boroughs of New York City, plus Duchess, Nassau, Putnam,
Suffolk, Sullivan, Orange, Rockland, Ulster, and Westchester counties.
Decisions regarding the custody of migrants in this geographic region are
made by ICE’s New York City Field Office. This dataset comes from a FOIA
request to ICE by the New York Civil Liberties Union.
The empirical analyses in Part III draw from these datasets covering the
period from 2012 to 2019. The datasets include more than twenty different
versions of the RCA algorithm, though the principal changes can be consolidated into three separate periods under the Obama administration and a final
period under the Trump administration. The data include detain and release
recommendations, the underlying risk levels, and the end users’ dissent to the
risk assessment recommendation on each case, allowing us to observe the
reaction of officers and supervisors within and across risk algorithms.
III.

FINDINGS: WIDESPREAD DETENTION OF VULNERABLE AND LOWER
RISK MIGRANTS

Our analysis shows that the Schriro Report did not herald a reckoning with the
scale of immigration detention. It instead resulted in a contest for power in which
political appointees and proponents of immigration detention reform lost to
ICE’s prevailing practice and culture. The RCA functioned to hide anti-immigrant bias and attempted initially to confine it. However, our findings demonstrate that through algorithmic bias, the risk tool has allowed ICE to continue to
detain migrants at increasingly greater rates. This occurred in two ways. First,
front-line ICE officers and supervisors overrode the RCA’s recommendation as
a matter of discretion. Second, ICE policymakers modified the algorithm to minimize the override rate such that officers with a bias for detention were able to
train the algorithm contrary to risk logic. Efforts to manipulate the RCA from the
top down and to obstruct the RCA from the bottom up combined to reduce the
number of cases in which the RCA recommended release or bond and to reduce
the number of cases in which ICE officers chose to release or grant bond.
In this section, we describe the results of the RCA tool over time. We
examine the results of each module in the RCA in turn and reveal a
174. Robert Koulish, Immigration Detention in the Risk Classification Assessment Era, 16 CONN.
PUB. INT. L.J. 1, 18 (2017).
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substantial drop in the rates of release and bond over the course of our study.
We conclude that policymakers and end-users subverted the RCA into a tool
of punishment in which ICE’s detention decisions bore little relation to risk.
A.

People with Special Vulnerabilities: Underreported and Largely
Detained

The general rule behind the first module on the RCA is that people with
special vulnerabilities should not be detained.175 This rule has particular significance as ICE officials told the United Nations High Commission for
Refugees it would “promote identification of vulnerable populations” in the
immigration enforcement process and would not detain people with special
vulnerabilities unless required by statute.176 The Obama administration made
similar assurances to Congress and the public.177 ICE’s concern for migrants
with special vulnerabilities is also signified by the placement of this module
first and the alterations to the RCA’s standard recommendations for people
with one or more “special vulnerabilities.”
In the “special vulnerabilities” module, officers are instructed to screen
migrants for serious physical illness; severe mental illness; disability; elderly
status; pregnancy; nursing; primary caretaker responsibilities; risk based on
sexual orientation or gender identity; or status as a victim of persecution or
torture, victim of sexual abuse, or victim of a violent crime or human trafficking.178 Among the list of eleven special vulnerabilities, the following seven
were identified as “priorities”: disability, elderly status, pregnant, nursing,
primary caretaking responsibility, serious mental illness, and serious physical
illness.179 As shown on the chart below, within those cases with a special vulnerability, the most frequently identified special vulnerability was the primary caretaking responsibility—reserved overwhelmingly for women.

175. See Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 808; Written Testimony of U.S. Immigration and Customs
Enforcement Director John Morton for a House Committee on the Judiciary Hearing Titled: “The
Release of Criminal Detainees by U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement: Policy or Politics?,” U.S.
DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Mar. 19, 2013), https://perma.cc/4FWG-YLY3 [hereinafter Morton 2013
Testimony]; Secretary Napolitano and ICE Assistant Secretary Morton Announce New Immigration
Detention Reform Initiatives, U.S. DEP’T OF HOMELAND SEC. (Oct. 6, 2009), https://perma.cc/U4WLZMPX (announcing, among other things, ICE’s plans to “develop an assessment tool to identify aliens
suitable for ATD [alternatives to detention],” and to “develop a risk assessment and custody
classification” to “enable detainees to be placed in an appropriate facility”).
176. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 65; Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 843; UNHCR
Roundtable, supra note 154, at 22–32.
177. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations for Fiscal Year 2013: Hearing on H.R. 5855
and S. 3216 before the Subcomm. on Homeland Sec. of the S. Comm. on Appropriations, 112th Cong. 11–
22 (2012) (statement of Janet Napolitano, Secretary, Department of Homeland Security); Morton 2013
Testimony, supra note 175.
178. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 806; U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Off. of Enf’t &
Removal Operations, Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide (n.d.), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA
RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 1491–92 [hereinafter Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide]; RCA
Quick Reference Guide, supra note 151, at 1745.
179. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, RCA Overview: Field Operations Briefing, in CONSOLIDATED
FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 234 [hereinafter Field Operations Briefing].
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The risk tool algorithm functions on a points system, which assigns scores
to risk factors for public safety and flight.180 Early on, we presumed the risk
tool would assign negative points to flight for people with special vulnerabilities. This would have lowered the risk level and, thus, lessened chances of a
detention recommendation. However, the point-based system excludes the
special vulnerabilities category.181 During our study period, the RCA did not
recommend detention for people with special vulnerabilities unless they were
subject to mandatory detention based on removal charges or they were in
reinstatement proceedings.182 Migrants with special vulnerabilities were recommended for release if the RCA determined that they were a “low” flight
risk and “low” public safety risk.183 Otherwise, the RCA delegated these
cases for the “supervisor to determine” whether to detain or release the person.184 By January 2014, the RCA shrunk the scope of mandatory detention for
migrants with special vulnerabilities. Migrants in reinstatement proceedings,
who had a special vulnerability, no longer received an RCA recommendation

180.
Rules).
181.
182.
183.
184.

RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules; Points-Based Scoring

Id. (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 808 n.94.
Id. at 808 n.95.
Id. at 808 n.96.
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to detain without bond unless they had a high public safety risk assessment.185
The RCA instead assigned the detain/release decision for these migrants to
the supervisor to determine.186
The results of our study of the RCA’s special vulnerabilities module are
two-fold. First, only a small percentage of migrants are categorized as having
special vulnerabilities. Second, ICE had little hesitation about detaining people with special vulnerabilities.
Though the RCA process required ICE officers to begin by evaluating the
individual for vulnerabilities, they were rarely detected. Based on the ground
rules for deciding special vulnerabilities, the empirical research shows very
few migrants—6 percent across the four years of our dataset—were categorized as having special vulnerabilities. Conversely, 93.99 percent have no
identified special vulnerability.
(National Dataset, N=454,891)
Special Vulnerabilities

N

%

None
1
2
3
4
5

427,546
25,441
1,689
184
23
8

93.99
5.59
0.37
0.04
0.01
0.001

Total

454,891

100.00

Though the rate of identification started much stronger, by the end of the
Obama administration, barely 6 percent of migrants were listed as having a
special vulnerability. The graph below illustrates the percentage of cases that
were identified as having a special vulnerability across our largest national
dataset.

185.
186.

Id. at 824 n.187.
Id.
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The low rate of people identified with one or more of the designated special vulnerabilities simply does not accord with the demographics of the
migrants in the dataset. The fact that 37 percent of the group migrated from
the Northern Triangle and 17 percent are women indicate that, at a minimum,
the numbers of primary caretakers and victims of persecution or sexual
assault should be much higher.187
Despite promises not to detain people with special vulnerabilities, ICE
officers and supervisors often made detention decisions that ran counter to
these assurances. Instructions for handling special vulnerabilities came from
a variety of sources, including training materials and FAQ sheets.188 But the
RCA did not make recommendations for most migrants with special vulnerabilities. Instead, the custody decisions were entirely within the discretion of
ICE supervisors, without an RCA recommendation to guide or override.189
The formal training materials underscored supervisors’ authority to detain
someone despite the presence of a special vulnerability.190 The RCA training

187. See PETER J. MEYER, CONG. RSCH. SERV., IF11151, CENTRAL AMERICAN MIGRATION: ROOT
CAUSES AND U.S. POLICY (2021) (noting a spike of migrants from the Northern Triangle in FY2019, followed by a dip likely attributable to COVID-19); D’VERA COHN, JEFFREY S. PASSEL & ANA GONZALEZBARRERA, RISE IN U.S. IMMIGRANTS FROM EL SALVADOR, GUATEMALA AND HONDURAS OUTPACES
GROWTH FROM ELSEWHERE, PEW RSCH. CTR. 16 (2017) (“Asylum applications from people born in El
Salvador, Guatemala and Honduras have risen sharply in recent years . . . .”); U.N. HIGH COMM’R FOR
REFUGEES, WOMEN ON THE RUN: FIRST-HAND ACCOUNTS OF REFUGEES FLEEING EL SALVADOR,
GUATEMALA, HONDURAS, AND MEXICO (2015) (illustrating the pervasiveness of sexual violence targeted
toward women in the Northern Triangle countries); Jeffrey Hallock, Ariel G. Ruiz Soto & Michael Fix, In
Search of Safety, Growing Numbers of Women Flee Central America, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (May 30,
2018), https://perma.cc/FCL7-7JSC (“Family apprehensions are also up from previous years, with more
families traveling together indicating that parents are no longer willing to leave children behind in the
country of origin—a departure from past trends.”).
188. Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 178, at 1491–92; RCA Quick
Reference Guide, supra note 151, at 1772–74; RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 81, at 52–58.
189. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
190. U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Off. of Enf’t & Removal Operations, RCA Scenario Playbook,
Version 1.1 (Sept. 2012), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 285.
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guidelines state that the presence of a special vulnerability based on the above
factors “however, . . . do not represent the required decisions that must be
reached when using the system.”191 Instead, the circumstances of each case
“and each field office will influence the decision-making process.”192 Thus,
the effect of having a special vulnerability on detention is up to the ICE
supervisor.
Our data show that ICE officers exercised that discretion in favor of detention. As the chart below shows, more than 70 percent of migrants with special
vulnerabilities were detained from 2012 to 2016.

Though most people with special vulnerabilities were detained, having one
or more special vulnerabilities did increase the likelihood of being released
from detention. The data show that the chances of being released are 22 percentage points higher if a migrant has a special vulnerability.
The bigger national dataset demonstrates the same trend as the detailed
data on detention rates above. Almost two-thirds, or 62.9 percent (17,188) of
migrants with special vulnerabilities (27,345) were detained. Of these, 20.7
percent (5,671) were mandatorily detained per statute and allegations in the
Notices to Appear. Notwithstanding assurances by top level Obama administration officials that people with special vulnerabilities would not receive
detention recommendations, 45.1 percent (12,321) of those not subject to
mandatory detention were still detained.

191.
192.

Id.
Id.
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With Special Vulnerabilities
Mandatory Detention
No
RCA Final Decision

Yes

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

Detain, with Bond

1,708

96.17

68

3.83

1,776

6.49

Detain, without bond

10,613

68.86

4,799

31.14

15,412

56.36

Release

9,353

92.08

804

7.92

10,157

37.14

Total

21,674

79.26

5,671

20.74

27,345

100

As a result of the high detention rates, pregnant women, the elderly, people
with mental illness and victims of persecution and torture are frequently held
in jail-like conditions, sometimes alongside defendants facing criminal
charges for violent offenses or serving criminal sentences.193 That reality is
anathema to ICE’s promises.194
In the end, the RCA failed to deliver on its promise to release vulnerable
migrants who face the risk of severe additional harm in detention. That failure stems from both the design of the algorithm, which provides ICE supervisors with unfettered discretion over custody decisions for most migrants with
an identified vulnerability, and the persistent bias of those ICE officials to
impose detention broadly.195
B.

Mandatory Detention: Congressionally Imposed Custody of Lower Risk
Migrants

The second module of the RCA assesses whether Congress mandated the
person’s detention. This module identifies people who are in full immigration
proceedings and subject to INA § 236(c), people with final removal orders
193. See, e.g., WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, PRISON FOR SURVIVORS: THE DETENTION OF WOMEN
SEEKING ASYLUM IN THE UNITED STATES 26–40 (2017), https://perma.cc/N947-DKL7 (detailing prisonlike conditions faced by detained female asylum seekers); NORA ELLMANN, IMMIGRATION DETENTION IS
DANGEROUS FOR WOMEN’S HEALTH AND RIGHTS, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS 9 (2019), https://perma.cc/
X97U-3MXG (“Due to the fact that nondedicated facilities often exist within criminal jails and prisons,
there may also be confusion and conflict between ICE [detainee health] standards and the standards of the
local facilities.”); S. POVERTY L. CENTER, NAT’L IMMIGR. PROJECT OF NAT’L LAW. GUILD & ADELANTE
ALA. WORKER CTR., SHADOW PRISONS: IMMIGRANT DETENTION IN THE SOUTH 7 (2016), https://perma.cc/
8WHC-EETB (finding a significant lack of “protection or accommodations to vulnerable detainees,
including elderly, disabled and LGBT individuals”); Mark Brunswick & Alejandra Matos, Detained
Immigrant Teen Assaulted by Registered Sex Offender in Sherburne County Jail, STAR TRIBUNE (Apr. 14,
2014, 10:51 AM), https://perma.cc/R3ES-D7BT (describing a particular incident of assault and the
general dangers of housing non-criminal immigrants alongside violent criminals).
194. See supra note 176 and accompanying text.
195. See infra Part III.C (discussing widespread bias in favor of detention).
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that are not yet executed, and people who have prior removal orders that
were reinstated upon reentry to the United States under INA § 241.196
Additionally, people in expedited removal proceedings under INA § 235 are
also identified at this initial stage.197 If the person was not authorized to enter
the United States and ICE has designated them for expedited removal, the
RCA will automatically recommend detention without bond and officers are
not required to perform the rest of the RCA.198
The mandatory detention assessment is largely automatic. The inputs for
mandatory detention are derived from various ICE databases, including
immigration history, case processing type, and the Federal Bureau of
Investigation (“FBI”)’s National Crime Information Center database, which
aggregates criminal history across jurisdictions.199 During our study period,
the RCA recommended that ICE detain without bond nearly all categories of
people with final orders.200
Migrants without a final order are screened for mandatory detention under
INA § 236(c).201 For this assessment, the mandatory detention module relies
on the statutes and allegations from the document used to initiate removal
proceedings (a Notice to Appear) to auto-populate the RCA.202 ICE officers
must review the migrant’s criminal history and ensure that the removal
charges are correct.203 The removal charges contained in the Notice to
Appear, not the criminal offenses on which those charges are based, are then
evaluated through the RCA to see if the removal charges trigger mandatory
detention under INA § 236(c).204 If they do, the RCA recommends detention
without bond regardless of risk level.205
At any given time, detention under § 236(c) accounts for about 18 percent
of all ICE encounters in our largest nationwide dataset. Of the 18 percent
(83,101) of migrants subject to mandatory detention under § 236(c), 96.9 percent (80,486) were detained without bond. The migrants in about 2 percent
(2,111) of the mandatory detention cases were actually released on community supervision.
196. Tim Gibney & Beth Mangum, Risk Classification Assessment Release 1.0 Business
Requirements Version 1.8 (Aug. 19, 2011), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 888–91
[hereinafter RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements]; RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 151, at
1743, 1745–46; RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
197. RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 151, at 1743.
198. Id.
199. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 817; see also U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Off. of Enf’t &
Removal Operations, Risk Classification Assessment (RCA) Quick Reference Guide, Version 3.0 (Mar.
2013), in CONSOLIDATED FOIA RESPONSES, supra note 8, at 1339 [hereinafter RCA Quick Reference
Guide 3.0]; Special Vulnerabilities Quick Reference Guide, supra note 178, at 1491.
200. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 832. People with “low” public safety and flight risk levels,
however, could receive release recommendations despite final orders of removal. Id.
201. Id. at 817 n.143.
202. RCA Quick Reference Guide 3.0, supra note 199, at 1339; RCA Release 1.0 Business
Requirements, supra note 196, at 888–89.
203. See id.
204. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 819 n.156.
205. Id. at 818 n.144.

34

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

Mandatory Detention
No
RCA Final Decision

Yes

Total

N

%

N

%

N

%

Detain, with Bond

49,476

98.99%

504

1.01%

49,980

100%

Detain, without Bond

287,556

78.13%

80,486

21.87%

368,042

100%

Release

34,758

94.27%

2,111

5.73%

36,869

100%

Total

371,790

81.73%

83,101

18.27%

454,891

100%

The RCA training materials acknowledge that some removal grounds that
trigger mandatory detention do not represent a high risk to public safety. For
example, the RCA’s national training course includes the case study of a person designated for mandatory detention based on statutes and allegations for
a drug possession conviction.206 The RCA designated this offense as “low”
severity and generated a “low” public safety risk classification.207 However,
because the offense is covered by § 236(c), the person received a detain,
without bond RCA recommendation and a mandatory detention designation.
As a result of the policy to run the full RCA on those migrants whose
detention is mandated by Congress, we were able to examine the RCA-determined riskiness of these groups and evaluate whether their risk levels support
Congress’s decision to mandate detention. Migrants subject to mandatory
detention are not substantially riskier than those subject to detention under
236(a).208 Approximately 56 percent of mandatorily detained migrants are
not “high” risks to public safety compared with 75 percent in the 236(a) category. Even more striking is the comparison of the flight risk levels. Nearly 50
percent of the people detained under § 236(c) are assessed as “low” flight risks
versus 30 percent of the § 236(a) category. The percentage of migrants that are
not “high” risk in either category is very similar for the mandatory detention
and discretionary detention groups with 37 percent of migrants under § 236(c)
and 31 percent under § 236(a) with “low” and “medium” risk combinations.
Despite this similar risk profile to those eligible for bond by statute, the more
than 23,000 lower risk migrants detained under § 236(c) during our study could
not seek a bond based on their lack of dangerousness or risk of flight.

206.
207.
208.

RCA SYSTEMS TRAINING, supra note 81, at 27–28.
Id. at 27–30; RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Crime Codes).
SIRINE SHEBAYA & ROBERT KOULISH, DETAINED WITHOUT PROCESS: THE EXCESSIVE USE OF
MANDATORY DETENTION AGAINST MARYLAND’S IMMIGRANTS (ACLU Md. 2016), https://perma.cc/
L3TP-2H5K.
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Detained Migrants Under § 236(c)
Risk of Public Safety

Risk of Flight

Low

Medium

High

Total

Low

1619 (2.59%)

11600 (18.59%)

16756 (26.85%)

29975 (48.04%)

Medium

2701 (4.33%)

7249 (11.62%)

5699 (9.13%)

15649 (25.08%)

High

3392 (5.44%)

8068 (12.93%)

5316 (8.52%)

16776 (26.88%)

Total

7712 (12.36%)

26917 (43.14%)

27771 (44.50%)

62,400

Detained Migrants Under § 236(a)
Risk of Public Safety

Risk of Flight

Low

Medium

High

Total

Low

1491 (3.01%)

6904 (13.92%)

6035 (12.17%)

14430 (29.10%)

Medium

4591 (9.26%)

8462 (17.07%)

4163 (8.40%)

17216 (34.72%)

High

9053 (18.26%)

6584 (13.28%)

2302 (4.64%)

17939 (36.18%)

Total

15135 (30.52%)

21950 (44.27%)

12500 (25.21%)

49,585

In theory, mandatory detention should apply to the riskiest migrants.
However, in practice, the statute sweeps in migrants in the “low” risk to public safety and flight risk categories. Were it not for mandatory detention, ICE
could release or assign a bond to thousands of migrants who do not represent
a “high” flight or safety risk. Mandatory detention, thus, stands as a fundamental obstacle to reducing detention by tailoring it to risk.
C.

Subverting the RCA Into a Tool of Punishment

Risk management does not occur in a political or administrative vacuum.209 The risk assessment process is political and reveals bias. In
Manipulating Risk, we demonstrated that enforcement priorities encouraged
policymakers to sever the RCA’s algorithm from core risk factors.210 Author
Robert Koulish and Professor Ernesto Calvo separately examined the prevalence and strength of officer bias toward detention.211 Our study of the RCA’s
outcomes here reveals the alarming results of these two dynamics.

209.
210.
211.

PASQUALE, supra note 19, at 4–6.
Id. at 794–95.
KOULISH & CALVO, supra note 164 (manuscript at ch. 3).

36

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL
1.

[Vol. 36:1

Algorithmic Bias: Subversion from the Top

In this section, we describe the incremental changes to the RCA’s scoring
algorithm and its recommendations, as well as the detention trends these
changes produced. The RCA was designed to be highly malleable with a labyrinthine system of factors, scores, and business rules. The algorithm can be
modified to change the factors assessed, the scores assigned to each factor; the
severity levels for criminal offenses; the scoring thresholds associated with
“high,” “medium,” or “low” risk levels; and the recommendation generated for
each combination of flight and public safety risk levels. Manipulation of any
one of these variables has the power to increase or decrease the likelihood of
detention for thousands of migrants.
The RCA’s algorithm changed nineteen times by our count between 2012 and
2016, with significant adjustments 2013, 2015, and 2017. We show that, over time,
the RCA became a means of imposing detention in nearly all cases, instead of driving ICE to use alternatives to detention as originally intended. This subversion of
the RCA’s purpose was achieved in two ways. First, policymakers at ICE headquarters adjusted the algorithm to result in more detention recommendations and to
eliminate bond recommendations. These endogenous and top-down manipulations
resulted in an algorithm heavily tilted toward detention without bond, regardless of
risk. Second, front line ICE officers increasingly dissented to RCA recommendations for release or bond, overriding the fundamental purpose of the RCA, and
headquarter officials capitulated. Officials designing the RCA’s algorithm used the
rate of officer dissent as a core metric to evaluate the RCA and therefore conformed
the RCA’s algorithm to officers’ detention preferences. This exogenous and bottom-up dynamic solidified the role of the RCA as a cloaking device: the RCA provided a veneer of risk logic to detention decisions that were unmoored from proven
risk factors. By examining the effects of the algorithmic changes and officer overrides, our study shows that immigration detention is not used to mitigate risk.
Detention is instead used to deter migration and punish migrants.
We review the progressive severance of the RCA algorithm from many risk
factors during the Obama administration, which occurred in three main periods.
The inaugural period, from July 2012 to December 2013, covers the RCA’s
phased deployment, the national launch in January 2013, and its first year of
nationwide operation. ICE headquarter officials adjusted the algorithm significantly in January 2014 (beginning Period Two) and again in February 2015 (beginning Period Three). With the election of former-President Trump, the RCA
saw the elimination of its recommendation for release in our final period.212
Period One: July 2012–December 2013
Detention priorities and enforcement priorities need not be the same. An
administration can prioritize enforcement of the immigration laws against
individuals who do not present a risk of flight or risk to public safety and
212.

Rosenberg & Levinson, supra note 163.
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therefore do not need to be detained. However, during Period One, the
Obama administration’s enforcement priorities largely coincided with
migrants presenting higher levels of risk.
When ICE launched the RCA, it incorporated ICE’s enforcement priorities
as outlined by its director at the time, John Morton, in a series of memoranda
known as the Morton Memos. The 2011 Morton Memo established a threetiered system that prioritized migrants with criminal history, followed by recent
entrants, followed by migrants with final orders of removal who absconded or
re-entered the United States. The first priority category emphasized “violent
criminals, felons, and repeat offenders.”213 Though the second category
included many asylum seekers who presented low risks of flight and low risks
to public safety and the first priority included migrants with any misdemeanor
conviction, the priority categories largely corresponded to groups with high
flight risks or risks to public safety. Thus, for the Period One, the RCA came
closest to aligning its scoring and custody recommendations with risk.
Period One: Public Safety
ICE translated the Morton Memo’s enforcement priorities into detention priorities largely through the public safety scoring rubric. Throughout our study,
the RCA scored all criminal charges and convictions, including those pending
or dropped; it did not score charges that are dismissed.214 The score for charges
or convictions were based on two criteria: (1) severity and (2) recency.215
The RCA identified an offense’s severity, and its corresponding score,
based on the severity level assigned to offense descriptions from the FBI’s
National Crime Information Center database.216 The RCA architects assigned
and adjusted these severity levels. During Period One, offenses ranged in severity from low to highest (Low=2; Moderate=4; High=6; Highest=7).217

Severity

Score

Low

2

Moderate

4

High

6

Highest

7

213. Memorandum from John Morton, Dir., U.S. Immgr. & Customs Enf’t, to All ICE Employees
regarding Civil Immigration Enforcement: Priorities for the Apprehension, Detention, and Removal of
Aliens (Mar. 2, 2011), https://perma.cc/7GCT-NCAC. Within Priority 1, the memo further defined subpriorities as Level 1, those convicted of “aggravated felonies” or two felonies; Level 2, those convicted of
any felony or three misdemeanors; and Level 3, those convicted of misdemeanors. Id. at § A. Recent
illegal entrants were Priority 2, and those with prior removal orders were Priority 3. Id.
214. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 809 n.101.
215. Id. at 810–11 n.112-114 and accompanying text.
216. Id. at 809 n.102 and accompanying text.
217. Id.
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Low severity crimes included offenses such as possessing a fraudulent immigration document, driving under the influence of drugs or alcohol (“DUI”),
almost all traffic offenses, domestic violence (“DV”), prostitution, and drug
possession. Moderate severity crimes included illegal entry, re-entry, drug
trafficking, assault, embezzlement, stolen property, petty larceny, and sex
crimes involving minors. High severity offenses included military desertion,
negligent manslaughter, sexual assault, robbery, burglary, aggravated assault,
drug smuggling, and arson. Finally, examples of the highest severity offenses
were homicide, treason and espionage, kidnapping, rape, and state offenses
for terroristic threats.218
The RCA first scored any charge or offense leading to the encounter with
ICE.219 In the instance of multiple charges, the charge that generates the highest score is used.220 Once a charge or conviction has been scored in the public
safety rubric, it is not used again.221
For offenses identified as “special public safety factors,” the RCA’s
designers assigned an additional seven points. “Special public safety factors”
included DUI and DV. These offenses were considered low severity and
therefore should have garnered a score of two. However, because the RCA
designated them as “special public safety factors,” they produced a score of
seven points—a value akin to rape, kidnapping, or homicide.
The RCA then scored the most severe remaining criminal conviction (if
any) based on its severity and recency:222
Age
< 5 years

5 – 10 years

10 – 15 years

> 15 years

Low

2

1

0

0

Moderate

4

3

2

1

High

6

6

5

5

Highest

7

6

5

5

Severity

Additional convictions and charges not yet scored by the RCA are assigned
additional points along with points for violations of custody or release conditions and allegations of gang affiliation.223 The total public safety score corresponded to one of three risk levels:224

218.
219.

RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Crime Codes).
RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 196, at 873, 968–69; RCA RULES AND
SCORING, supra note 9 (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
220. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 809 n.104 and accompanying text.
221. Id. at 809 n.105.
222. RCA Release 1.0 Business Requirements, supra note 196, at 975; RCA RULES AND SCORING,
supra note 9 (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
223. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 811–13 nn.117–29 and accompanying text.
224. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
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Public Safety
Minimum

Maximum

Low

0

4

Medium

5

11

12

53

High

Within the criminal justice system, detention aligns with dangerousness:
the higher the risk to public safety, the more likely the person is to face jail
while awaiting resolution of the criminal charge.225 Researchers have shown
that adherence to this risk principle can lower recidivism.226
The problem facing the RCA is the absence of evidence connecting migration to crime, or immigration detention to future crime.227 In fact, scholars
have shown that migrants are less likely than U.S.-born Americans to commit
serious criminal offenses.228 Nor does the deportation of migrants result in
lower crime rates.229 At the most basic level, there is no evidence that the
theory underpinning risk tools in the criminal justice system translates to the
immigration system.
Moreover, our data show that most people in detention have not committed
serious crimes, and thus, should not have been detained according to the risk
principle. Data from the detailed national dataset (N=2,411) show that the
most common offense responsible for migrant encounters with ICE was DUI
at 38.2 percent (221). The immigration offense of illegal entry was second at
32.2 percent (186). Traffic offenses were third at 16.9 percent (98), and felony assault was fourth at 8.3 percent (48). Finally, selling controlled substances was fifth at 4.32 percent (25). For almost every person detained with or
without bond, the data show that the immigration enforcement arrest the lowest hanging fruit—DUI or traffic offenders—followed by immigration
offenses. Only 12.6 percent of detained migrants had committed felony-level
offenses. Even then, a third of these felony-level offenses were for non-violent drug crimes. Thus, according to risk logic, 87.5 percent of the detained

225. See Noferi & Koulish, supra note 13, at 54–55.
226. Lowenkamp & Latessa, Understanding the Risk Principle: How and Why Correctional
Interventions Can Harm Low-Risk Offenders, TOPICS IN COMMUNITY CORRECTIONS, at 3–6
(2004).
227. See Rubén G. Rumbaut, Roberto G. Gonzales, Golnaz Komaie & Charlie V. Morgan,
Debunking the Myth of Immigrant Criminality: Imprisonment Among First-and Second-Generation
Young Men, MIGRATION POL’Y INST. (June 1, 2006), https://perma.cc/T95Z-CUB8.
´
´ G. RUMBAUT, AM. IMMIGR. COUNCIL, THE
& RUBEN
228. WALTER A. EWING, DANIEL E. MARTINEZ
CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION IN THE UNITED STATES 4–6 (2015), https://perma.cc/5ABK-ZNAG;
see also Alex Nowrasteh, New Research on Illegal Immigration and Crime, CATO INST. (Oct. 13, 2000, 4:
16 PM), https://perma.cc/MVW5-C77F.
229. A recent study about deportation showed that higher deportation rates are not associated with
lower crime rates. See generally ANNIE LAURIE HINES & GIOVANNI PERI, IZA INST. OF LAB. ECON.,
IMMIGRANTS’ DEPORTATIONS, LOCAL CRIME AND POLICE EFFECTIVENESS 22 (2019), https://perma.cc/
2GYS-A4XA.
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population lacked any public safety justification for their immigration
incarceration.

Period One: Flight Risk
The public safety component of the RCA assigned positive numbers for
factors that indicated a migrant’s community ties and negative numbers for
indicia of flight. Factors include prior expulsions at the border or interior; the
status of any deportation proceeding; violations of release conditions; drug
use; possession of valid identification; ties to family in the United States with
permanent immigration status; stability of address; military or education
enrollment; work authorization; legal representation; and assets.230 In Period
One, the scores assigned to each risk level were as follows:

Flight Risk

Low

230.

Minimum

Maximum

none

−5

Medium

−4

1

High

2

none

Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 813–15.
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During the first eighteen months of the RCA, it was difficult to achieve a
low flight risk score; a low flight risk score required many community ties to
arrive at a -5 score.
Combining Risk to Public Safety and Risk of Flight
During Period One, only the people who had mandatory detention removal
charges or had a prior removal order and reentered the United States received
the recommendation of “detain, without bond.” The algorithm produced a
recommendation based on the combination of flight risk and public safety
risk levels for everyone else as follows:231
Public Safety
Low

Low

-5 or lower

Medium

High

0 to 4

5 to 11

12 or higher

Release

Supervisor to

Detain, with bond

Determine
Flight Risk
Medium

High

-4 to 1

2 or higher

Supervisor to

Supervisor to

Determine

Determine

Detain, with bond

Detain, with bond

Detain, with bond

Detain, with bond

The table below shows the RCA’s risk levels for migrants in custody during Period One:
Period One RCA Risk Combinations (N = 170,437)
Risk of Flight
Low

Medium

High

Total

N

2,101

18,056

47,500

67,657

%

1.23%

10.59%

27.87%

39.70%

N

3,189

25,444

36,136

64,769

%

1.87%

14.93%

21.20%

38.00%

N

1,739

13,428

22,844

38,011

%

1.02%

7.88%

13.40%

22.30%

N

7,029

56,928

106,480

170,437

%

4.12%

33.40%

62.47%

100.00%

Risk to Public Safety
Low

Medium

High

Total

231.

RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
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According to risk logic and the RCA’s rules for each risk combination, the
RCA should have recommended release for 1.2 percent (2,101) of the
migrants. A supervisor should have determined the status for 27.4 percent
(45,793) of the migrants. And 71.6 percent should have been detained, with
bond. However, the data show that the RCA recommended detention without
bond for 577 out of 2,101 migrants in the low-low category, while it recommended 1,491 for release. This is because the mandatory detention statutes
prevent ICE from releasing or offering bond to almost one-third of cases that
are “low” risk to flight and public safety.
When it came to ICE’s final custody decisions, 89.6 percent of migrants
were detained. Almost 75 percent were detained without bond, 16 percent
were detained with bond, and 10.4 percent were released, in large part due to
the supervisor decisions for some migrants within medium risk categories.
Final Custody Decisions in Period One
N

%

Detain, with Bond

27,956

16.4

Detain, without Bond

124,747

73.19

Release

17,734

10.41

Total

170,437

100

Period Two: January 2014 to February 2015
Sociologist Ulrich Beck warned that the advent of risk science has been responsible for the creation of new risks.232 Period Two reflects Beck’s warning; it shows a more restrictive algorithm with fewer migrants in the “low”
risk categories, and as a result, even more migrants in detention.
Period Two also reflects new objectives for the RCA tool that create significant internal tension between its purported objectives and its evaluation metrics. In January 2014, ICE issued a memo to field offices that announced
changes “to strengthen alignment both with ICE priorities and with the actual
Detain/Release decisions currently being generated by” ICE risk officers,
with the intended outcome of “a decrease in the number of times supervisors
need to override RCA recommendations.”233 These criteria for modification
replaced traditional objectives like validation that the changes better mitigated flight or danger and transparency in the risk process or paring down
detention rates. The changes in Period Two had the effect of the “tail wagging the dog,” with ICE officers’ decisions training the algorithm rather than
232. ULRICH BECK, THE RISK SOCIETY: TOWARDS A NEW MODERNITY ch. 1 (1992). The idea that
risk is inherent in modern society contributes to formation of global risk society. Risk tools may themselves produce new risks. See, e.g., Anthony Giddens, Risk Society: The Context of British Politics, in
THE POLITICS OF RISK SOCIETY 23, 27 (Jane Franklin ed., 1998) (stating that a risk society is “a society
increasingly preoccupied with the future . . . which generates the notion of risk”).
233. 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 8, at 1734.
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objective risk science training the ICE officers.234 Patterns of punitive bias in
officers thus pulled the algorithm in a more punitive direction.
Period Two: Public Safety
The changes in Period Two “place[d] greater emphasis on aliens’ criminal
records” so that fewer people received a “low” public safety risk assessment.235 This shift in the algorithm accommodated end-users’ preference to
detain migrants with criminal history. To accommodate dissent, the risk tool
was modified in a variety of ways. RCA architects changed the detain/release
rubric to increase recommendations to detain migrants with criminal history
and to release migrants with some community ties and no criminal history.236
No migrant would receive a “detain” recommendation based on “high” flight
risk and “low” public safety risk; this combination would instead result in a
recommendation for the supervisor to determine detention or release.237
Migrants with a “low” public safety score and a “medium” flight risk score
would also be recommended for release.238 The changes represented a ratcheting down in detention recommendations for people who present a “low”
public safety risk, in addition to expanding the group referred to a supervisor
for decision. 239 Additionally, migrants with “high” public safety scores and
“medium” or “high” flight risk scores no longer received bond recommendations. Thus, the default recommendation for these categories became “detain
without bond.”240 This change coincided with increased scores assigned to
certain criminal offenses.241 Consequently, more people were likely to be
assessed as a “high” risk to public safety and receive no bond unless they had
overwhelming community ties.242
Offenses that shifted from low severity to moderate severity include
domestic violence, drug possession, indecent exposure, bestiality, necrophilia, and prostitution offenses.243 Offenses that changed from low to
high severity included procuring minors for prostitution and enticement
of a minor for indecent purposes.244 At the same time, other classes of
offenses were reduced from moderate to low severity, including, the immigration crimes of trafficking in fraudulent documents and illegal
234. Id. (“The RCA scoring methodology used to make Detain/Release recommendations is being
revised to address feedback from ERO officers and to strengthen alignment both with ICE priorities and
with the actual Detain/Release decisions currently being generated by ERO RCA end users. This should
result in a decrease in the number of times supervisors need to override RCA recommendations.”).
235. Id.
236. Id. at 1734–35.
237. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 824 n.187.
238. Id. at 824 n.188.
239. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
240. Id.
241. Id. (Crime Codes; Points-Based Scoring Rules).
242. 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 8, at 1734 (“[The Public Safety Scoring
Updates] will result in fewer aliens receiving a Public Safety Score of Low, and more aliens receiving a
Public Safety Score of High.”).
243. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Crime Codes).
244. Id.
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reentry; passing a fraudulent check; burglary; petty larceny; stolen property offenses; deceptive business practices; not performing duties as a
government official; or a licensing violation.245 With these changes,
many property crimes, immigration crimes, and business crimes generated lower public safety scores.
While the RCA recommendations for people with “low” public safety risk
levels were less restrictive, obtaining a “low” risk assessment became harder.
As severity levels and the assigned points were adjusted for certain crimes,
the thresholds for “low” and “medium” risk assessments narrowed, pushing
more people into the “medium” and “high” risk categories. The changes
made it increasingly difficult to receive an assessment of low public safety
risk with any criminal history. The new levels were the following (the original threshold is struck through): 246

Public Safety Risk

Low

Minimum

Maximum

0

4 (Period 1)

5 (Period 1)

11 (Period 1)

4 (Period 2)

8 (Period 2)

12 (Period 1)

53

3 (Period 2)
Medium

High

9 (Period 2)

During this period, two traffic offenses within the last five years would
place someone in the “medium” public safety risk category, as did a single drug possession conviction within the last five years.247 These
offenses, therefore, precluded a release recommendation. Similarly, if
within the last ten years, someone with a single drug possession charge
had any other conviction (including a traffic offense), it would be impossible to receive a recommendation of release. As ICE officers reverseengineered the risk system through dissent, the algorithm produced
higher detention rates for migrants with criminal records.

245.
246.
247.

Id.
Id. (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
See id. (Point-Based Scoring Rules).
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Period Two: Flight Risk
In terms of flight risk, the changes weighed certain community ties more
heavily to reduce the flight risk scores while simultaneously adjusting the
risk thresholds to increase the number of migrants assessed as a “low” risk of
flight.248 In January 2014, the new flight risk levels were as follows: 249

Flight Risk
Minimum
Low

Maximum

none

−5
−2

Medium

1

−4

High

−1

2

2

none

3

The changes to the RCA recommendations—again, aimed at reducing the
rate of supervisor overrides250—appeared as follows (RCA recommendations
in Period One are struck through):

Public Safety
Low

Low

Medium

High

12 or higher

0 to 3

4 to 8

9 or higher

Release

Supervisor to
Determine

Detain, with bond

−4 to 1

Supervisor to
Determine Release

Supervisor to
Determine

Detain, with bond

−1 to 2
2 or higher

Detain, Eligible for

Detain, with bond

3 or higher

Bond

Detain, with
bond

−5 or lower

Supervisor to
determine

248.
249.
250.

High

5 to 11

-2 or lower

Flight Risk

Medium

0 to 4

Id.
Id. (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 8, at 1734.

Detain, without bond

Detain, without bond
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RCA Risk Combinations for Period Two (N=124,543)
Risk of Flight
Low

Risk to Public Safety
Low

Medium

High

Medium

High

Total

N

6,181

4,398

15,546

26,125

%

4.96%

3.53%

12.48%

20.98%

N

15,081

8,400

22,556

46,037

%

12.11%

6.74%

18.11%

36.96%

N

17,527

8,973

25,881

52,381

%

14.07%

7.20%

20.78%

42.06%

Of the more than 21,000 migrants who the RCA should have recommended for release based on their risk levels, many of the “low/low” risk
migrants and “low” public safety/”medium” flight migrants were detained,
again, in part because of the mandatory detention statutes and in part due to
officer overrides.
Final Custody Decisions in Period Two
N

%

Detain, with Bond

17,636

14.16

Detain, without Bond

96,921

77.82

Release

9,986

8.02

124,543

100

Total

During Period Two, ICE detained 92.1 percent of migrants in ICE custody. A full 78 percent were detained without bond. However, based on
the RCA recommendation rubric, only 38 percent should have received
this outcome. Additionally, only 8 percent were released on community
supervision even though the RCA should have recommended more than
17 percent of cases for release. Even with the restrictions to the algorithm
for people with criminal history, officer overrides still thwarted the
RCA’s rubric for release.
Period Three: February 2015 to October 2016
On November 20, 2014, former president Obama announced, “our immigration system is broken—and everybody knows it.”251 He continued,

251.

Address to the Nation on Immigration Reform, 2 PUB. PAPERS 1509 (Nov. 20, 2014).
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Over the past six years deportations of criminals are up 80%, and that’s
why we’re going to keep focusing enforcement resources on actual
threats to our security. Felons, not families. Criminals, not children.
Gang members, not a mom who’s working hard to provide for her
kids.252
Then-DHS Secretary Jeh Johnson clarified how the “felons, not families”
policy would translate into three enforcement priorities in November
2014.253 Priority One included people convicted of “aggravated felonies” as
defined in immigration law, a state felony (other than an offense containing
immigration status as an element), or an offense involving gang activity, as
well as people apprehended at the border.254 Priority Two included people
convicted of three misdemeanors arising out of separate incidents; a “significant misdemeanor,” with a sentence of more than ninety days; and certain
domestic violence, DUI, burglary, firearms, sexual abuse, and drug crimes.255
Priority Two also included people who entered the United States without authorization and could not prove they had done so before January 1, 2014.256
Priority Three included people with removal orders issued on or after January
1, 2014.257 The RCA algorithm was changed so that it would recommend
detention for people falling in any of these categories. A guide to the RCA

252. Id.
253. Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S.
Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, R. Gil Kerlikowske, Comm’r, U.S. Customs and
Border Prot., Leon Rodriguez, Dir., U.S. Citizenship and Immigr. Servs. & Alan D. Bersin, Acting
Assistant Sec’y for Pol’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., regarding Policies for the Apprehension, Detention
and Removal of Undocumented Immigrants 3–4 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/S56P-EMME
[hereinafter Johnson Priorities Memo]; see also Memorandum from Jeh Charles Johnson, Sec’y, U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., to Thomas S. Winkowski, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, Megan
Mack, Officer, Off. of C.R. and C.L. & Philip A. McNamara, Assistant Sec’y for Intergovernmental
Affs., Dep’t of Homeland Sec., regarding Secure Communities 2 (Nov. 20, 2014), https://perma.cc/HEJ6NTAF [hereinafter Johnson Secure Communities Memo] (limiting ICE detainer requests to requests for
notification, for those in the first two priorities, only with criminal convictions). President Obama also
issued a series of executive actions that attempted to expand the group of migrants who could receive a
formal reprieve from immigration enforcement efforts accompanied by work authorization. 2014
Executive Actions on Immigration, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVS. (last updated Apr. 15, 2015),
https://perma.cc/SK4J-9VEH. The Order included (1) the expansion of DACA and introduction of
DAPA; (2) the termination of secure communities and its replacement by the Priority Enforcement
Program; and (3) further clarification of enforcement priorities to focus on violent offenders. Id.; Johnson
Priorities Memo, supra, at 253; Johnson Secure Communities Memo, supra note 253, at 2–3. DAPA
consisted of expanding temporary protection to over four million undocumented parents of DACA
recipients. Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 147–48 (5th Cir. 2015), aff’d by an equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271. However, a federal court subsequently blocked DAPA as an executive overreach.
Id. at 146 (affirming a district court decision enjoining DAPA). Even then, the directive to focus
enforcement resources away from people who would have been covered by this program remained. See
Jeh Johnson, Sec’y, Dep’t of Homeland Sec., Statement on Today’s Supreme Court Decision (June 23,
2016), https://perma.cc/3EHE-N88S.
254. Johnson Priorities Memo, supra note 253, at 3.
255. Id. at 3–4.
256. Id. at 4.
257. Id.

48

GEORGETOWN IMMIGRATION LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 36:1

scoring updates explained this realignment258 and set out the new enforcement priorities alongside the detention recommendations the RCA would
now typically produce.259
Period Three: Public Safety
To accommodate former-President Obama’s enforcement priorities, a “medium” risk for public safety usually resulted in the recommendation of detention
without bond. Another important change to public safety risk algorithm was the
addition of new “special public safety factors” called “serious misdemeanors.”260
These offenses consisted of drug distribution and weapons offenses.261 Like DUI
and DV offenses, these charges (regardless of conviction) generated seven
points, making detention without bond the most likely recommendation.262
Simultaneously, the RCA added a new offense severity level of “lowest.”263
The “lowest” severity level offenses included traffic offenses (except for hit and
run, DUI, and transporting dangerous materials).264 These offenses had previously been categorized as low and would have generated two points for the public safety score if they were the basis for the ICE encounter or had occurred
within the last five years.265 Under the prior rubric, two traffic offenses within
the last five years equated to a “medium” public safety risk level. The addition
of a “lowest” severity level finally removed offenses like driving without a
license—common in states that do not provide drivers’ licenses to residents
without proof of immigration status—from the public safety risk assessment.266
Severity

Score

Lowest

0

Low

2

Moderate

4

High

6

Highest

7

The risk levels assigned to the public safety scores remained unchanged
from Period Two and were as follows:

258. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 831 n.204; Executive Action Scoring Guide, supra note 156,
at 1796–1800.
259. Executive Action Scoring Guide, supra note 156, at 1798.
260. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Crime Codes).
261. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 827 n.198.
262. RCA RULES AND SCORING, supra note 9 (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
263. Id. (Crime Codes).
264. Id.
265. Id. (Crime Codes; Points-Based Scoring Rules).
266. Id. (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
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Public Safety Risk
Minimum
Low

0

Maximum
4 (Period 1)
3 (Period 2 & 3)

Medium

High

5 (Period 1)

11 (Period 1)

4 (Period 2 & 3)

8 (Period 2 & 3)

12 (Period 1)

53

9 (Period 2 & 3)

Period Three: Flight Risk
The flight risk algorithm experienced a radical shift during Period Three.
In accordance with the prioritization of recent arrivals, the date of entry
became the flashpoint for detention or release. The factor of “entry without
authorization” after January 2014 was assigned fourteen points.267 That factor
alone would result in a “high” flight risk assessment and a recommendation
for detention without bond.268 This runs in sharp contrast to an unknown
entry date, receiving one point, or entering the country without authorization
before January 1, 2014, which was assigned zero points.269
Additionally, abuse of a visa or visa waiver program and a final order of removal on or after January 1, 2014 was assigned seven points.270 This score
corresponded to a “medium” flight risk level and the recommendation of
detention without bond unless combined with a “low” public safety score.271
In that case, the custody decision was given to the “supervisor to determine”
without an RCA recommendation.
Having a final order before January 1, 2014 and being previously removed
garnered one point, while a final order before January 1, 2014 without removal and no final order of removal scored zero points. People in these
groups could achieve a “low” risk of flight assessment due simply to the age
of their immigration history.
Most factors that were actually tied to risk of flight were either eliminated
or reduced to 0 points. These included violation of supervision conditions; a
bond breach; failure to comply with a prior removal order; an active case in
removal proceedings; a pending appeal; pending application for immigration
benefits; legal counsel; possessing valid or false identification; work authorization; and enrollment in an educational program.272 The point values for the
remaining factors that indicated community ties were reduced such that
267.
268.
269.
270.
271.
272.

Id. (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
Id. (Points-Based Scoring Rules; Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
Id. (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
Id.
Id. (Logic-Based Scoring Rules).
Id. (Points-Based Scoring Rules).
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recent entry and visa violations could not be overcome with positive community ties.
The remaining factors and the points assigned are:273
� Living with immediate family members is assigned -1 points.
� Lived at their address for six months or more is assigned -1 points.
� Service in the armed services by migrant or spouse is assigned -1
points.
� Having a U.S. citizen spouse or child is assigned -1 points.
� (If no U.S. citizen spouse/child), spouse or child in the local community is assigned -1 points.
� (If no U.S. citizen spouse/child), family in United States but not in
local community is assigned 0 points.
� Owning property or considerable assets is assigned -1 points.
The calibration of public safety scores to risk levels also saw major
changes in February 2015.274

Flight Risk
Minimum
Low

none

Maximum
-5 (Period 1)
-2 (Period 2)
1 (Period 3)

Medium

High

-4 (Period 1)

1 (Period 1)

-1 (Period 2)

2 (Period 2)

2

8

2 (Period 1)

none

3 (Period 2)
9

Period Three was the most restrictive and punitive period for detention
under the Obama administration. From this period onward, the algorithm
stopped recommending bond eligibility for detained migrants. Notably, the
public safety thresholds for each risk level did not change even though the
recommendation to detain without bond was applied to all “medium” and
“high” public safety groups.275 Though the detention level was already
hovering at 90 percent, the elimination of a bond recommendation by
ICE had a significant practical effect because it forced those people

273.
274.
275.

Id.
Id.
Id. (Logic Based Scoring Rules).
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eligible for bond to wait for weeks to seek bond in immigration court.276 The
punitive shift queries the purpose of risk in immigration detention. If the
RCA does not protect lower risk migrants from detention, what purpose does
it serve?
Public Safety
Low

Medium

0 to 3
0 to 4
Low

-5 or lower

Release (All Periods)

-2 or lower

4 to 8

9 or higher

5 to 11

12 or higher

Supervisor to
Determine
(All Periods)

1 or lower
Supervisor to Determine
(Period 1)

-4 to 1

Medium

-1 to 2
Flight

Supervisor to
Determine
(Period 1 & 2)

2 to 8

Risk

High

Release (Period 2)

Detain, with Bond
(Period 1 & 2)
Detain, without Bond
(Period 3)
Detain, with Bond
(Period 1)
Detain, without Bond
(Period 2 &3)

Detain, without
Supervisor to Determine
High

2 or higher
3 or higher

Bond (Period 3)

Detain, with Bond
(Period 1)

Detain, with Bond
(Period 1 & 2)

Detain, with Bond
(Period 1)

Supervisor to determine

Detain, without
Bond (Period 3)

Detain, without Bond
(Period 2 & 3)

9 or higher
(Period 2 & 3)

RCA Risk Combinations for Period Three
Risk of Flight
Risk to Public Safety
Low

Medium

High

Total

Low

Medium

High

Total

N

6,907

2,459

20,575

29,941

%

4.32%

1.54%

12.87%

18.72%

N

27,529

5,170

13,651

46,350

%

17.22%

3.23%

8.54%

28.98%

N

56,538

10,219

16,863

83,620

%

35.36%

6.39%

10.55%

52.29%

N

90,974

17,848

51,089

159,911

%

56.89%

11.16%

31.95%

100.00%

276. See supra Part I.A (describing process of seeking custody redetermination hearing in immigration court and widespread delays).
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According to the RCA recommendation logic in Period Three, the RCA
should have recommended detention without bond for 66,478 cases and designated the custody decision to a supervisor without providing a recommendation for 86,526 cases. The final custody decisions below show that ICE
officers exercised their discretion almost always to impose detention without
bond, such that more than 146,000 cases were designated for detention without bond. Additionally, because the RCA no longer recommended bond for
any risk category, migrants who were eligible for bond under § 236(a) had to
rely on the rare exercise of officer discretion or challenge their detention
without bond in immigration court.
Final Custody Decisions for Period Three
N
Detain, with Bond
Detain, without Bond
Release
Total

%

4,388

2.74

146,374

91.53

9,149

5.72

159,911

100

The Results of Algorithmic Changes
The trends in the risk profiles of the people detained tell an important
story about the relationship between the RCA and immigration detention.
These data show the impact of the algorithm’s shift to become increasingly
punitive over time. Risk levels became tighter at the low end and broader
at the high end; the same offense earned fewer points in Period One and
more points by Period Three. The RCA also stopped accounting for many
community ties. In Period One, the most punitive risk recommendation
was detain, with bond. By Period Three, that recommendation was eliminated and the recommendation to detain, without bond had colonized the
map—covering five out of nine possible combinations of public safety and
flight risk levels. Here, we track the three periods of the RCA with these
algorithmic changes in mind.
First, the share of people detained mandatorily under § 236(c) remained
steady at about 18 percent over three significant algorithmic changes from
2012 to 2016. This means that regardless of risk levels—which our study
shows were often “low” or “medium” in this group—approximately one
fifth of all people in civil immigration detention will remain there, for
months if not years, unless Congress reforms the mandatory detention statute or there is a successful challenge to its constitutionality, as discussed
further in Part IV.
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The risk to public safety trends demonstrate the RCA’s punitive trajectory
most clearly. Early on in Period One, “low” public safety risk was the most common category of risk in detention, and “high” public safety risk was the least common category. By Period Three, these levels reversed themselves, with “high”
risk comprising the most populous category and “low” public safety risk the least
populous among detained migrants. The rate of migrants in the “low” risk to public safety category in Period One was nearly 40 percent, more than halving to 19
percent by Period Three. The manipulation of the algorithm squeezed the “low”
risk to public safety category to produce and widen the parameters of the category
for high risk to public safety.277,278 Over time, the algorithmic changes pushed
noncitizens into the “medium” and “high” risk categories for the same offense.

277.
278.

2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 8, at 1734.
Id.
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Next, the trend lines for the percentage of detained cases per flight risk levels traverses two significant adjustments to the algorithm with the opposite
effect. The rate of cases with a “low” flight risk assessment from 2012 to
2016 flips from a relatively low rate in Period One to a dominating share of
detained cases in Period Three. About 60 percent of detained cases were
“high” flight risk during Period One, whereas about 60 percent of detained
cases were “low” flight risk during Period Three. This dramatic shift in risk
profile reflects a combination of algorithmic changes. First, the ratcheting up
of the public safety rubric meant migrants with any criminal history were
generally detained. Second, enforcement efforts followed the Obama administration’s focus on migrants with criminal history. Third, the flight risk rubric was tied nearly exclusively to date of entry or final removal order such
that migrants who had lived in the United States for several years were generally categorized as “low” risk of flight. Together, these policies meant that
migrants with any criminal history would be detained regardless of their
“low” risk of flight.

Finally, and most severely, the data show the near elimination of bond during Period Three. This drop off coincides with the change to the RCA algorithm to eliminate a recommendation for bond. With this change, a bond
from ICE, and therefore prompt release upon its payment, was only possible
if an ICE officer granted bond in a case that the RCA designated for the
“supervisor to determine” or overrode the RCA’s recommendation to release
or detain without bond.
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Though the percentage of people subject to § 236(c) remained steady, the portion of people detained under § 236(a) did not. This population dropped in Period
Two and again in Period Three. Indeed, in Period Three, very few migrants who
were subject to discretionary detention under § 236(a), rather than mandatory
detention, were going through full immigration court proceedings. This seems to
reflect the 2014 enforcement priorities directed at families crossing the southern
border.279 Indeed, our random sample from the national dataset shows that more
than 54 percent of people detained during our study period were subject to expedited removal under § 235 or reinstatement or under § 241. As a result, these
migrants received the RCA’s recommendation to detain without bond.
Expedited Removal, 893 Cases
Risk of Flight
Low

Low

Risk to Public
Safety

Medium

High

Medium

High

Detain, without bond

13 (1.46%)

38 (4.26%)

768 (86%)
6 (0.67%)

Detain, with bond

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Release

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

4 (0.45%)

Detain, without bond

5 (0.56%)

8 (0.9%)

41 (4.59%)
0 (0%)

Detain, with bond

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Release

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

1 (0.11%)

Detain, without bond

1 (0.11%)

0 (0%)

8 (0.9%)

Detain, with bond

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

Release

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

0 (0%)

279. Johnson Priorities Memo, supra note 253, at 3; Executive Action Scoring Guide, supra note
156, at 1798.
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Except for those people in expedited removal proceedings, the RCA is performed in full notwithstanding their mandatory detention category.280
Although ICE is not required to assess flight risk and public safety risk in
expedited removal cases,281 our data show where it did. Almost all migrants
designated for expedited removal are detained without bond. And almost all
the expedited removal cases are categorized as a “high” flight risk and “low”
public safety risk.
The “high” flight risk designation is due largely to the manipulation of the
RCA algorithm during Period Three, which scored recent entry to the United
States as high risk regardless of community ties, eligibility for immigration
benefits, or support from legal counsel. These migrants would be better
served through an alternative to detention. This is especially so for migrants
with a positive credible fear interview who were nonetheless detained.
Absent the mandatory detention provision of § 235 for migrants in expedited
removal and the manufactured “high” risk designation, they could have been
released. Their detention instead illustrates the failures of the RCA to protect
victims of trauma and to align detention with risk.
2.

Officer Bias: Subversion from the Bottom

While enforcement priorities were one of several factors responsible for
changing the algorithm, the rate at which ICE supervisors disagreed with the
algorithm’s custody recommendations were equally important. Such disagreements came in the form of the override rate that measured the frequency
at which supervisors’ final decisions diverged from the RCA’s recommendation. ICE has stated that it assesses the efficacy of its risk tool by evaluating
the extent that ICE officers override the tool’s detain or release recommendation.282 Since override rates became the stock and trade of the internal evaluations for the tool’s effectiveness, the corresponding incentive for the RCA’s
designers was to create an algorithm that appeased the preferences of ICE
supervisors. The idea that detention ought to accommodate risk levels thus
evaporated, as the risk algorithm instead accommodated officer preference.
The RCA became an example of the tail wagging the dog, resulting in the
loss of liberty for thousands of people.
Like risk tools generally, the RCA is only as good as the people and objectives that support them. Just as people are prone to bias, the people who create,
administer, and account for algorithms bring their own explicit and implicit
biases into the creation and review processes. Scholars and advocates have
documented how the culture within ICE is anti-immigrant and anti-Latinx.283
280. See RCA Quick Reference Guide, supra note 151, at 1743.
281. Evans & Koulish, supra note 6, at 817.
282. Field Operations Briefing, supra note 179, at 228; 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 8, at 1734.
283. See Bill Ong Hing, Institutional Racism, ICE Raids, and Immigration Reform, 44 U.S.F. L.
REV. 307, 351 (2009) (“The construction of the U.S. immigration policy and enforcement regime has
resulted in a framework that victimizes Latin and Asian immigrants. These immigrants of color end up
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Recent news and government investigations284 and depositions gathered during lawsuits have revealed ICE and CBP are replete with racism, incompetence, and corruption.285 The immigration algorithm has thus contended with
racism and punitive anti-immigrant bias inside DHS, and ICE in particular.
We have published elsewhere that anti-immigrant punitive behavior by ICE
officials hamstrung the RCA.286 An original architect of the RCA told the
authors that Director Morton, charged with implementing the RCA, met resistance from administrators implementing the risk tool in the field.287
Additionally, the National ICE Council,288 the union that represents ICE officers
and agents, strongly opposed risk assessment because a risk tool threatened to
diminish the power of its officers.289 Ultimately, with the final decision to
release or detain someone assigned to ICE supervisors, these officers were able
to detain nearly everyone despite the RCA’s purpose to limit detention.
Across our study period, the RCA’s designers delegated different risk categories to ICE supervisors for custody decisions in the first instance. Notwithstanding
these changes, the overall percent of cases delegated directly to a supervisor’s discretion remained steady at about twenty-two percent.
Supervisor to Determine (N=454,891)
Period One = 22.75%
Period Two = 22.14%
Period Three = 22.32%
The final custody decisions between 2012 and 2016 demonstrate that ICE
supervisors deploy this discretion to impose detention without bond in most
cases. These officers decided to detain nearly 81 percent of cases without
bond and dramatically reduced the number of cases in which they granted
release or bond over time.
being the subject of ICE raids. They are the ones who comprise the immigration visa backlogs. They are
the ones that attempt to traverse the hostile southwest border. Their victimization has been institutional´
31,
ized.”); Doris Marie Provine, Institutional Racism in Enforcing Immigration Law, 8 NORTEAMERICA
33–36 (2013) (explaining the racialized nature of federal immigration enforcement); Hamed Aleaziz,
“Sickening” and “Proof” of Racism: DHS Officials Said Stephen Miller Must Go After His Emails Were
Released, BUZZFEED NEWS (Nov. 15, 2019, 5:39 PM), https://perma.cc/7NRJ-DDHR.
284. Michael German, Hidden in Plain Sight: Racism, White Supremacy, and Far-Right Militancy in
Law Enforcement, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUST. (Aug. 27, 2020), https://perma.cc/B82E-2LCT.
285. Zack Linly, 3 Black Border Patrol Officers File Lawsuit Against CBP Alleging Constant Racial
Profiling and Harassment of Black Travelers, ROOT (Apr. 4, 2021, 3:00 PM), https://perma.cc/EQB96XAV; Customs and Border Protection Settles Federal Lawsuit with American Citizens Racially Profiled
and Unlawfully Detained for Speaking Spanish, ACLU (Nov. 24, 2020), https://perma.cc/C7AP-Q9ZG;
Susan Ferriss, ‘Shocked and Humiliated’: Lawsuits Accuse Customs, Border Officers of Invasive
Searches of Minors, Women, CTR. FOR PUB. INTEGRITY (Sept. 12, 2018, 10:57 PM), https://perma.cc/
HH8G-7FYZ.
286. KOULISH & CALVO, supra note 164 (manuscript at 72–85).
287. Interview with High-Ranking DHS Official (May 17, 2019) (on file with authors).
288. The American Federation of Government Employees National ICE Council represents approximately 7,600 officers, agents, and employees. About AFGE National Council, NAT’L ICE COUNCIL,
https://perma.cc/GQF9-QKCB.
289. KOULISH & CALVO, supra note 164 (manuscript at 72).
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Final Custody Decisions

Detain, with Bond

Detain, without Bond

Release

Total

Period 1

Period 2

Period 3

Total

N

27,956

17,636

4,388

49,980

%

6.15%

3.88%

0.96%

10.99%

N

124,747

96,921

146,374

368,042

%

27.42%

21.31%

32.18%

80.91%

N

17,734

9,986

9,149

36,869

%

3.90%

2.20%

2.01%

8.11%

N

170,437

124,543

159,911

454,891

%

37.47%

27.38%

35.15%

100.00%

Data on the final custody decisions show an increase in the detention rate
during the tenure of the RCA. There is a significant increase in Period Two
and an even larger leap in the detention rate in Period Three. The data also
show a significant decrease in cases with bond recommendations during
Period Three. No migrants arriving after February 2015 were recommended
for bond, and hence nearly all (92 percent) were detained without bond.
Those released into the community on supervision also halved during the
Obama administration.

The data from our study period show bias in ICE decisions to refrain from
releasing low-risk migrants in ICE custody. As the presidential election
approached in Fall 2012, detention officers increasingly subjected migrants
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to detention through their discretionary authority.290 Moreover, the rates of
officer dissent during the Obama administration prompted changes to the
algorithm to limit recommendations for release or bond.291 The RAID Project
has elsewhere documented the influence of electoral politics and punitive factors on detention decisions.292 Specifically, detention officers make consistently punitive decisions to undermine even the illusion of fairness produced
by the risk algorithm.
In 2016, for the first time in history, the ICE Council endorsed a candidate
for president, backing Donald Trump.293 Rank and file officers saw in Trump
a president committed to removing all limits on immigration enforcement.294
The Trump administration’s zero-tolerance policy delivered on this promise.
As a result, starting in February 2017, migrants were arrested and brought
into custody regardless of risk level as an expression of that administration’s
universal enforcement policy. Although the Obama administration removed
the bond recommendation from the RCA in February 2015, migrants with
“low” flight and “low” public safety risk assessments were still recommended
for release. ICE officers registered their discontent with the Obama-era algorithm and its release recommendation by overriding the RCA recommendation to release low-risk migrants. Accordingly, the officer overrides led to the
detention of low-risk migrants starting that month. The no-release policy was
then formalized in June 2017 through further manipulation of the RCA’s recommendations. Following this shift, the rate of officer dissent plummeted.
The graph below demonstrates that ICE officers train the risk algorithm by
using overrides. It shows an abrupt increase in supervisor overrides of risk
recommendations for migrants who are a “low” risk to public safety. The
override rate (share of officer disagreement) climbed from about 15 percent
in February 2017 to almost 40 percent in May 2017. The supervisors’ override rate quickly dropped in June 2017 with the advent of the new algorithm,
which stopped recommending release for any risk category. The dramatic
decline in officer dissent rates reflect their assent to the new algorithm their
overrides generated.

290. Robert Koulish & Ernesto Calvo, The Human Factor: Algorithms, Dissenters, and Detention in
Immigration Enforcement, 102 SOC. SCI. Q. 1761, 1777–78 (2021).
291. Field Operations Briefing, supra note 179, at 228; 2014 RCA Scoring Methodology Change, supra note 8, at 1734.
292. KOULISH & CALVO, supra note 164 (manuscript at 72–74).
293. Id. (manscript at 72–74).
294. ICE ERO Immigration Arrests Climb Nearly 40%, U.S. IMMIGR. & CUSTOMS ENF’T (Oct. 7,
2021), https://perma.cc/9BFK-PH3N; Franklin Foer, How Trump Radicalized ICE, ATLANTIC (Sept.
2018), https://perma.cc/T5SS-S7XS.
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The same trend in override rate followed by assent to changes in the algorithm is evident for the RCA recommendations in all risk categories, simply to a
lesser degree. The officer override rate for all RCA recommendations then levels out to a relatively low rate under the Trump administration’s algorithm.

Our third dataset from the New York Area of Operations provides further
evidence of officer bias toward detention under the Trump administration.
After 2013, the rate of detention for migrants with “low” public safety risk
levels dropped off dramatically until former-President Trump took office.
The table below shows an almost doubling of detention for low-risk migrants
between the end of the Obama administration in 2016 (15 percent) and the
start of the Trump administration in 2017 (29 percent). The rate of low-risk
migrants detained without bond then further increased in 2018 (32 percent)
and again in 2019 (33 percent). This increase in detention of migrants with a
“low” public safety risk results from the combination of the Trump administration’s universal enforcement policy, its elimination of a release
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recommendation in the RCA, and the unfettered exercise of ICE officers’ discretion to detain.
Migrants Detained by the New York City ICE Field Office by Public
Safety Risk Level
Low

Public

Medium

Safety
Risk Level

High

Total

2013

2014

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

N

1,996

896

187

228

844

1,035

431

Total

%

38.93

23.05

9.94

15.31

28.78

31.70

32.95

28.24

N

2,268

1,773

605

463

901

1,085

415

7,510

%

44.24

45.60

32.16

31.09

30.72

33.23

31.72

37.76

5,617

N

863

1,219

1,089

798

1,188

1,145

462

6,764

%

16.83

31.35

57.89

53.59

40.50

35.07

35.32

34.00

N

5,127

3,888

1,881

1,489

2,933

3,265

1,308

19,891

%

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

100

Note: The 2019 data include information until mid-July and was projected
to reach rates similar to those of 2017 and 2018.
Officer bias to detain is also apparent in the increased share of migrants
detained without bond within this dataset. In the next graph, we see the decisions to detain, without bond, within the “low” and “medium” public safety
and flight risk level combinations between 2013 and 2019.

The graph shows a remarkable spike in no bond detention for almost every
low-risk migrant. The rate for the combination of low public safety risk and
low flight risk went from a 40 percent detention rate in 2013, to about 35 percent in 2014, and then skyrocketed to 100 percent by 2018. This approach to
near total detention without bond for low-risk migrants reflects ICE officers’
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agreement with the Trump administration’s no-release policy. At the same
time, for those migrants eligible for bond by statute, these data show that their
detention bore no relationship to risk.
3.

The Loss of Algorithmic Fairness Due to Algorithmic Bias

The dramatic shift in risk scoring and custody recommendations from 2012
to 2016 raises questions about the overall fairness of the algorithm. For our purposes, algorithmic fairness means that similar cases are scored alike and similarly scored cases are treated similarly.295 In the case of the RCA, migrants with
the same history and characteristics might have been released in Period One but
detained in Period Three due to the increasingly restrictive edits to the risk algorithm. This variance in RCA outcomes challenges the algorithm’s fairness.
Too often, an algorithm can follow human behavior into the realm of biased
determinations, which can have serious consequences.296 Racial bias is a particularly salient driver of algorithmic bias.297 ProPublica has shown pretrial detention risk scores are biased against Black defendants.298 Generally, “[o]nly 20
percent of the people predicted to commit violent crimes actually went on to do
so.”299 The formula was particularly likely to falsely tag Black defendants as
future criminals, wrongly labeling them this way at almost twice the rate as
white defendants.300 On paper, a corrective measure would be to “blind” algorithms to race,301 but in reality, algorithms mirror the racism that already infects
the decision process. Another study found the reproduction of old biases in algorithmically generated bail decisions in New Jersey, even though the algorithm
was more accurate than the professionals before it.302
Evaluating an algorithm’s fairness identifies and mitigates bias that can imbue
human decisions.303 Algorithmic fairness shines a corrective gaze upon such bias.304

295. See Sam Corbett-Davies, Emma Pierson, Avi Feller, Sharad Goel & Aziz Huq, Algorithmic
Decision Making and the Cost of Fairness 1 (Stan. Univ., Working Paper, 2017).
296. VIRGINIA EUBANKS, AUTOMATING INEQUALITY: HOW HIGH-TECH TOOLS PROFILE, POLICE, AND
PUNISH THE POOR 6–7 (2019); Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ashesh Rambachan,
Algorithmic Fairness, 108 AEA PAPERS & PROC. 22, 22 (2018) (expressing concerns that biases are
“baked in” algorithms “[b]ecause the data used to train these algorithms are themselves tinged with stereotypes and past discrimination”).
297. See generally JANE CHUNG, RACISM IN, RACISM OUT: A PRIMER ON ALGORITHMIC RACISM,
PUB. CITIZEN (2021), https://perma.cc/2VGR-YTSX (discussing the various areas—including medical
care, schooling, policing, and housing—that are impacted by “predictive algorithmic racism”); James A.
Allen, The Color of Algorithms: An Analysis and Proposed Research Agenda for Deterring Algorithmic
Redlining, 46 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 219, 235–53 (2019) (discussing the racial implications of algorithms
used in housing); RUHA BENJAMIN, RACE AFTER TECHNOLOGY (2019).
298. Angwin, Larson, Mattu & Kirchner, supra note 30.
299. Id.
300. Id.
301. Kleinberg, Ludwig, Mullainathan & Rambachan, supra note 296, at 22.
302. Motherboard, One State Is Replacing Bail Hearings With . . . An Algorithm, FUTURISM (Mar. 6,
2017), https://perma.cc/34Q3-Z5K4.
303. CATHY O’NEIL, WEAPONS OF MATH DESTRUCTION: HOW BIG DATA INCREASES INEQUALITY
AND THREATENS DEMOCRACY, ch. 5 (2016).
304. Jon Kleinberg, Jens Ludwig, Sendhil Mullainathan & Ziad Obermeyer, Prediction Policy
Problems, 105 AM. ECON. REV. 491, 494–95 (2015).
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The problem that befalls the RCA is that an external a standard of measure
is needed to adequately assess the tool for fairness. The RCA’s designers,
however, measured the tool’s accuracy backwards through the rate of field
officers’ dissent.305 Consequently, the RCA has no neutral arbiter and no
objective, external standard by which to measure fairness. Instead, the
RCA’s quest for acceptance through expanding the categories of migrants
recommended for detention without bond and eliminating the categories recommended for release resulted in divergent outcomes based on the same
facts. Yet, our data indicate that this lack of fairness was of little concern.
Moreover, as in the criminal justice system, the burden of algorithmic bias in
the RCA was borne by Black and Brown people. Almost everyone in immigration detention in our study was a person of color. As the RCA’s architects
succumbed to the preferences of ICE officers and adjusted the algorithm
accordingly, a Black or Brown migrant’s prospect for release vanished alongside any claim of algorithmic fairness in the RCA.
IV.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE RCA’S RESULTS FOR DETENTION POLICY UNDER
THE BIDEN ADMINISTRATION

It has been a little more than a decade since ICE first launched the risk classification tool. During this time, immigration detention numbers reached
477,523 under the Obama administration, and then reached unprecedented
levels under the Trump administration, approaching 500,000 detainees in
2019.306 Our data show that the RCA has failed on its own terms and instead
was manipulated and subverted over time to detain migrants representing all
levels of risk, with few exceptions. Of particular concern is the detention of
low-risk migrants.307 More broadly, our study demonstrates ICE’s practice of
deliberately detaining migrants regardless of individual circumstances,
thereby perpetuating a system of mass detention for migrants of color.308
These results demand urgent attention and fundamental reforms in order to
put an end to mass civil incarceration.
We do not purport to set forth a package of solutions to the many layered
and interlocking problems raised by our results. However, to navigate a path
forward, we review the implications of the RCA’s outcomes and their intersection with other scholarship and proposals309 for: (A) people with special

305.
306.
307.

KOULISH & CALVO, supra note 164 (manuscript at ch. 1).
See Kassie, supra notes 133–34 and accompanying text.
See NOELLE SMART & ADAM GARCIA, VERA INST. OF JUST., TRACKING COVID-19 IN
IMMIGRATION DETENTION: A DASHBOARD OF ICE DATA, (2020), https://perma.cc/RU7X-43ZG.
308. Rowaida Abdelaziz, Black Immigrants Are Still Fighting Racism in the U.S. Immigration
System, HUFFPOST (July 2, 2021), https://perma.cc/RVB8-SH5W; JULIANA MORGAN-TROSTLE, KEXIN
ZHENG & CARL LIPSCOMBE, BLACK ALLIANCE FOR JUST IMMIGR. & N.Y.U. SCH. OF L. IMMIGRANT RTS.
CLINIC, Part II: Black Immigrants in the Mass Criminalization System, in THE STATE OF BLACK
IMMIGRANTS 1, 24–26 (2016).
´
, supra note 90, at 77–95; Koh, supra note 26 (manuscript at Part II);
309. See, e.g., HERNANDEZ
Markowitz, supra note 34, at 129–43.
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vulnerabilities; (B) the scope of mandatory detention; (C) the utility of the
risk tool; and (D) the nature of immigration enforcement in the future.
A.

People With Special Vulnerabilities

Migrants with special vulnerabilities were not supposed to be subject to
detention in significant numbers with the advent of the RCA. The risk tool
gained support from the international community in large part because it was
presented as a palliative for vulnerable migrants. Instead, our data show that
special vulnerabilities screening was underutilized by ICE. Only 6 percent of
the nearly half million migrants screened by the RCA during our study were
identified with special vulnerabilities even though the list of vulnerabilities
included being the primary caretaker and being a victim of trauma. The low
rates of vulnerabilities identified simply cannot be accurate given the demographics of the study population, which included large numbers of women
and even larger numbers of people in expedited removal proceedings, many
of whom were likely fleeing harm and trauma in their home countries.
For the minority of cases in which the RCA identified a special vulnerability, detention was still the most likely outcome. Even though the RCA did
not recommend detention for people with special vulnerabilities unless they
were subject to mandatory detention, migrants with special vulnerabilities
were almost as likely to be detained as those without them. Our study coincides with research by the Center for American Progress that found that the
RCA did little to prevent the widespread detention of LGBTQIþ people, despite the fact that these individuals face high rates of sexual abuse in
detention.310
Failure of the RCA’s screening mechanism to identify elderly and pregnant migrants as well as people with serious physical illnesses has particularly grave consequences during the COVID-19 pandemic. Migrants have
died in detention, suffered from severe illness, spread the virus to other people inside and outside detention centers, and contributed to its presence
worldwide as a result of ICE’s poor screening, mitigation, and treatment
measures.311 ICE remains subject to settlement agreements and further challenges for the COVID-related harms detention causes to vulnerable
migrants.312
310. Sharita Gruberg, ICE Officers Overwhelmingly Use Their Discretion to Detain LGBT
Immigrants, CTR. FOR AM. PROGRESS (Oct. 26, 2016, 11:20 AM), https://perma.cc/WR4U-AAEG.
311. See, e.g., Joel Rose, Internal ICE Reviews of Two Immigrant Deaths Stoke Fears About
COVID-19 Care, NPR (Apr. 29, 2020, 2:31 PM), https://perma.cc/U2KK-HPBN; Jimmy Jenkins & Matt
Katz, ‘A Ticking Time Bomb’: Advocates Warn COVID-19 Is Spreading Rapidly Behind Bars, NPR (Apr.
28, 2020, 5:00 AM), https://perma.cc/4US6-G86X; Lily Levin, ICE Detention Centers: Dangerous,
Ticking Time Bombs, NC POL’Y WATCH (Apr. 21, 2020), https://perma.cc/LL9H-P67Z; Immigration
Detention and Covid-19, supra note 74 (chronicling developments in ICE’s mismanagement of the
COVID-19 pandemic and related events).
312. See, e.g., Fraihat v. U.S. Immigration & Customs Enf’t, 445 F. Supp. 3d 709 (C.D. Cal. 2020);
Pimentel-Estrada v. Barr, 458 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (W.D. Wash. 2020); Basank v. Decker, 449 F. Supp. 3d
205 (S.D.N.Y. 2020); Roman v. Wolf, No. 20-00768 TJH (PVCx), 2020 WL 1952656 (C.D. Cal. Apr. 23,
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Additionally, many of the criteria characterized as special vulnerabilities
are listed as factors that should militate against taking an enforcement action
in the Biden administration’s recent directive on enforcement priorities.313
However, if ICE systematically under-identifies these factors, as our research
indicates, it will not make enforcement choices properly and will fail to
implement the administration’s policy.
As with many of our other findings, the detention outcome for vulnerable
migrants is largely attributable to the exercise of supervisor discretion. The
RCA designates most cases in this group for the supervisor to determine
detention or release in the first instance and does not provide a custody recommendation at all. As we see throughout the study, that discretion to decide
whether to detain or release a person was usually exercised in favor of detention, even when other harms to the person detained and their family members
are recognized314 and despite the fact that the tool was intended to prevent
these harms.
To avoid the widespread detention of vulnerable people in civil immigration detention and the harms that ensue, fundamental changes to detention
policies are required. Robust screening procedures, training, and regular
audits are needed so that people particularly susceptible to harms in detention
are actually identified.315 At the same time, the level of discretion that lies
with ICE line officers should be reined in. More fundamentally, a recommendation of release should be the firm default for this group (as well as for all
migrants within the immigration enforcement system). Any exception to
release for someone with a special vulnerability should require strong evidence of danger to others, beyond criminal history alone,316 and high-level
approval should be necessary to detain someone with a special vulnerability.
2020); Kate Morrissey, Lawsuit Filed for First COVID-19 Death in Immigration Custody, SAN DIEGO
UNION-TRIB. (Dec. 22, 2020, 10:49 AM), https://perma.cc/E9RM-HXHC; Settlement Reached in
Landmark COVID-19 Class Action Case Against Bristol County House of Correction WILMERHALE
(Apr. 7, 2021), https://perma.cc/6T9S-3UR8; Natalia E. Contreras, No COVID Masks or Hand Soap at
Indiana ICE Detention Facility, Complaint Says, INDIANAPOLIS STAR (June 8, 2021, 12:05 PM), https://
perma.cc/Q2C8-7S3H.
313. See Memorandum from Alejandro N. Mayorkas, Sec’y, U.S. Dep’t Homeland Sec., to Tae D.
Johnson, Acting Dir., U.S. Immigr. & Customs Enf’t, 3 (Sept. 30, 2021), https://perma.cc/U5Z2-NRU4.
314. See Rabin Amicus Brief, supra note 147, at 25–29; The Expansion and Troubling Use of ICE
Detention: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigr. and Citizenship of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary,
116th Cong. 158–166 (2019) (statement of the Ctr. for Victims of Torture); HAJAR HABBACH, KATHRYN
HAMPTON & RANIT MISHORI, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., “YOU WILL NEVER SEE YOUR CHILD AGAIN”:
THE PERSISTENT PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFECTS OF FAMILY SEPARATION (2020), https://perma.cc/J7Y5YZM3.
315. See NAT’L COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, Receiving Screening (2011), https://
perma.cc/C3T3-WAXE; NAT’L COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, Receiving Screening (2019),
https://perma.cc/6Q8C-RWLN; NAT’L COMM. ON CORRECTIONAL HEALTH CARE, Initial Health
Assessment (2016), https://perma.cc/QMN7-BYYV; Michael S Martin, Ian Colman, Alexander Simpson
& Kwame McKenzie, Mental Health Screening Tools in Correctional Institutions: A Systematic Review,
13 BMC PSYCHIATRY 275 (2013).
316. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678, 690–91 (2001) (stating that preventative detention is only acceptable “when limited to specially dangerous individuals and subject to strong procedural protections”
and that indefinite detention is only acceptable when “the dangerousness rationale [is] accompanied by
some other special circumstances, such as mental illness”).
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The Scope of Mandatory Detention

The mandatory detention statutes prevent ICE from tailoring detention to
risk. These statutes have been upheld based on presumptions that the categories of migrants covered by the laws represent greater flight risks, greater risk
to public safety, or both.317 These presumptions, however, are belied by the
data. A greater portion of people subject to custody under § 236(c) have
lower flight risk levels than those in § 236(a) proceedings. Additionally, the
percentage of migrants with “low” and “medium” risk combinations is nearly
identical in the § 236(c) and § 236(a) categories. Further, the scoring algorithm was altered to make nearly any criminal history generate a “medium”
or “high” risk level. In doing so, the public safety module became a tool of
preventative detention rather than a validated measure of risk. Nearly 12,000
migrants the RCA should have recommended for release based on their low
risk levels were detained instead. Mandatory detention statutes likely stood
as an obstacle in many of these cases. Similarly, more than 23,000 migrants
who were not “high” risks to public safety or for flight were detained without
bond under § 236(c). The same is true for migrants designated for expedited
removal and detained under § 235. Nearly all migrants in this category in our
study were assessed as low public safety threats and high risks of flight due to
the RCA’s automatic designation of recent entry as a high flight risk. With a
true assessment of community ties, most of this group would likely represent
low risks of flight and danger to the community and should not be detained.
Overall, even by the RCA’s inflated measures, risk levels do not justify the
mandatory detention statutes.
Our data show detention does not bear a relationship to flight risk and danger for many migrants held under these statutes. Congress should therefore
eliminate its dictates to detain and require individualized justification for the
detention of any migrant. Alternatively, the administration or Congress could
seek to interpret custody in a way that does not require incarceration but
rather includes community monitoring and guardianship as pending legislation would provide.318 Absent legislative and administrative reforms, the
Supreme Court should revisit mandatory detention in light of the evidence
that the statutes do not correlate to risk and should eliminate the preventative
detention of thousands of people as anathema to our Constitution.319

317. See id. at 697 (differentiating a statute that applies “to ordinary visa violators” from mandatory
detention that focus on “terrorists and criminals”); Demore v. Kim, 538 U.S. 510, 519–21 (2003);
Jennings v. Rodriguez, 138 S. Ct. 830, 836, 848 (2018); Johnson v. Guzman , 141 S. Ct. 2271, 2281
(2021).
318. See S. REP. NO. 117-000, at 30–40 (2021) (considering appropriations for DHS and outlining
the use, review, and validation of risk classification assessment in mandatory detention).
319. NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR., ENDING MANDATORY DET. 4 (2021), https://perma.cc/97XH(proposing a congressional course of action).

2021]
C.

PUNISHING WITH IMPUNITY

67

The Future of the RCA

Our study shows that the risk tool has failed on its own terms. It neither
tamed mass detention nor aligned detention to risk for several reasons. The
risk tool was largely borrowed from criminal justice pretrial detention without taking stock of significant differences between criminal law and civil
law. There was no external validation and calibration of the tool to actual
flight risk or danger in the civil context. Hence the RCA’s performance measurement became subjective, ultimately rooted in detention officer dissents,
and thereby allowing detention officers to rig the risk assessment system.
The RCA could not temper the blunt force of the Trump administration’s
anti-immigrant politics or the Obama administration’s decision to detain all
enforcement priorities regardless of risk. Instead, the RCA helped conceal
the hazard of mass detention under the cloak of risk science. As the RCA
designers manipulated the public safety algorithm to make nearly any crime
worthy of detention, the RCA labeled more and more migrants as intolerable
risks. In the end, millions of migrants were marked with a presumption of
dangerousness,320 reinforcing the criminal-immigrant (or crimmigrant321)
narrative.
A standout feature of the RCA was its ability to replicate systemic racism
at scale.322 It automated detention and allowed ICE officers to execute their
bias toward detention more efficiently through driving changes to the algorithm. Small-bore changes to the algorithm produced large-scale results:
shifting points and severity levels for the same offense; changing the scoring
thresholds to increase “medium” and “high” risk assessments; and tightening
detention recommendations across the board. By the end of our study period,
the RCA applied detention to nearly everyone with criminal history. This punitive bias in the risk tool ensured that victims of a racist criminal justice system were saddled with a second stint of imprisonment for the same offense.
Ethnic profiling has also been a ritual of ICE enforcement.323 The usual suspects for immigration enforcement are almost always poor and Black or
Brown.324 The RCA combination of punitive bias in the algorithm with racial
320. KOULISH & CALVO, supra note 164 (manuscript at ch. 4).
321. FRANKO, supra note 108, at 21–52.
322. See Ong Hing, supra note 283, at 309 (“Racism has become institutionalized in our immigration
—a regime that focuses mostly on Latinos, especially Mexicans, and occasionally on Asians.”); Ben &
Sophie Westenra, Racism, Immigration and Policing, in RACE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE, AND MIGRATION
CONTROL: ENFORCING THE BOUNDARIES OF BELONGING 61 (Mary Bosworth, Alpa Parmar & Yolanda
Vázquez eds., 2018).
323. Kevin R. Johnson, The Case Against Race Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 78 WASH.
U.L.Q. 675, 676–97 (2000); Christian Briggs, Note, The Reasonableness of Race-Based Suspicion: The
Fourth Amendment and the Costs and Benefits of Racial Profiling in Immigration Enforcement, 88 S.
CALIF. L. REV. 379, 380 (2015).
324. Jeanette Covington, Round Up the Usual Suspects: Racial Profiling and the War on Drugs, in
PETIT APARTHEID IN THE U.S. CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: THE DARK FIGURE OF RACISM 27, 27 (Dragan
Milovanovic & Katheryn K. Russell-Brown eds., 2001); César Cuauhtémoc Garcı́a Hernández, La Migra
in the Mirror: Immigration Enforcement and Racial Profiling on the Texas Border, 23 NOTRE DAME J.L.
ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 167, 179–89 (2009).
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bias in policing imposed double punishment on migrants of color and the preventative detention the Schriro Report called to stop.325 Moreover, the algorithm removed responsibility for mass detention from human beings to the
machine.
Contrary to its purpose, the RCA facilitated the unjustifiable detention of
migrants through the aggressive use of detention against low-risk immigrants. In this way, the RCA borrowed crime control penologies like “broken
windows” policing, which plagued minority communities in urban centers a
generation ago, and created their corollary in immigration control. By recommending detention for migrants with minor offenses, the RCA supported ICE
officers as they followed the crime control pattern of the 1980s and rounded
up and detained the low hanging fruit in migrant communities of color.326
If DHS continues to deploy the RCA, as it is presently considering,327 it
must function very differently. The scoring system and factors assessed
should ensure that detention is a rare exception to liberty infringement in civil
law enforcement and that detention is closely tied to non-punitive justifications. While there may be the rare case in which a threat to national security
could support immigration detention, routine criminal history does not.
Flight risk also fails to justify detention in the face of a growing body of evidence that community support programs are highly effective at ensuring
appearances in court and for ICE supervision appointments.328 In light of the
efficacy of alternatives to detention and the absence of a risk-based justification for civil detention in the vast majority of cases, release must be the
default. Furthermore, any tool used to circumscribe detention will fail if the
ultimate decision is left to line officer discretion. Thus, any override of a
release disposition should be limited and subject to close scrutiny by highlevel officials.

325. See Schriro, supra notes 130, 141.
326. See David Spener, Controlling the Border in El Paso del Norte: Operation Blockade or
Operation Charade?, in ETHNOGRAPHY AT THE BORDER 182, 186 (Pablo Vila ed., 2003); Margaret
Edwards, The Understandings and Human Cost of ‘Prevention through Deterrence,’ as Seen Amongst
Advocates in the United States and Mexico, SIT GRADUATE INST., https://perma.cc/HYR7-2XWQ
(discussing the intentionally punitive American border strategy within the context of the United States’
more general “Prevention through Deterrence” approach to immigration enforcement).
327. See S. REP. NO. 117-000, at 30–40 (considering appropriations for DHS and outlining the use,
review, and validation of risk classification assessment in mandatory detention).
328. See Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 539–40 (1979); Hernandez v. Sessions, 872 F.3d 976, 991
(9th Cir. 2017) (noting that ICE’s Intensive Supervision Appearance Program “resulted in a 99% attendance rate at all EOIR hearings and a 95% attendance rate at final hearings”); id. at 990 (quoting Pugh v.
Rainwater, 572 F.2d 1053, 1058 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc)) (“Detention of an indigent ‘for inability to post
money bail’ is impermissible if the individuals’ ‘appearance at trial could reasonably be assured by one of
the alternate forms of release.’”); VERA INST. OF JUST., supra note 153, at 2 (noting the success of the
Vera Institute’s Appearance Assistance Program); AM. IMMIGR. LAWS. ASS’N, LUTHERAN IMMIGR. AND
REFUGEE SERV., NAT’L IMMIGRANT JUST. CTR. & WOMEN’S REFUGEE COMM’N, THE REAL
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION 1–3 (2021); U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-26,
ALTERNATIVES TO DETENTION: IMPROVED DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSES NEEDED TO BETTER
ASSESS PROGRAM EFFECTIVENESS 35 (2014); CONG. RSCH. SERV., R45804, IMMIGRATION: ALTERNATIVES
TO DETENTION (ATD) PROGRAMS 9 (2019).
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The COVID-19 pandemic led to a massive reduction in the number of people detained, dropping from more than 50,000 daily to under 15,000. This
creates an opportunity to test the actual risks that released migrants present.
The release of, or decision not to detain, thousands of migrants who would
have been detained absent the pandemic could serve as a natural experiment
to allow for the RCA’s recalibration in a way that measures true risk of flight
and danger and maximizes release.329
D.

The Nature of Immigration Enforcement and the Use of Detention

Our data show that ICE imposed detention in almost all cases, regardless
of risk level, including for people considered low risk by even the RCA’s elevated standards. Indeed, punitive bias within ICE was so powerful that it bent
the RCA to ICE’s will. With the veneer of risk is removed from ICE’s detention decisions, the only remaining purposes for detaining low-risk migrants
are to deter and punish.330 The use of civil detention in this way raises a host
of problems for the nature of immigration enforcement under the Biden
administration.
First, using detention to deter does not work. Professor Emily Ryo recently
conducted a study on the impact of detention on migrants arriving at the U.S.
border.331 She found that detention does not keep others from migrating.332 It
simply reinforces perceptions of the United States as a country that is unfair
to migrants and operates outside the rule of law.333 The perception that the
United States treats migrants unfairly, in turn, reduces the effectiveness of
immigration enforcement efforts. People are less likely to comply with legal
requirements they perceive as unfair and far more likely to comply when
they believe requirements are fairly applied.334 Thus, President Biden’s border policies that are driving detention rates back up335 may be counterproductive to his goal of reducing unauthorized migration across the southern
border.336
Second and relatedly, the use of civil detention to punish provides further
evidence that ICE operates as a rogue agency when it is directed to limit
enforcement actions. A growing body of literature and reporting documents
329. See Hilary J. Allen, Regulatory Sandboxes, 87 GEORGE WASH. L. REV. 579 (2019) (describing
use of regulatory experiments that allow the regulator and the firm being regulated to operate in a more
relaxed environment in order to refine required regulations).
330. See Bearden v. Georgia, 461 U.S. 660, 671–72 (1983).
331. See generally Emily Ryo, The Unintended Consequences of U.S. Immigration Enforcement
Policies, 118 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. OF SCIS., May 17, 2021, at 1. [hereinafter Ryo, Unintended
Consequences]; see also Emily Ryo, Detention as Deterrence, 71 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 237 (2019).
332. Ryo, Unintended Consequences, supra note 331, at 7–8; see also Ryo, Detention as Deterrence,
supra note 331, at 248.
333. See Ryo, Unintended Consequences, supra note 331, at 8.
334. Emily Ryo, Less Enforcement, More Compliance: Rethinking Unauthorized Migration, 62
UCLA L. REV. 622, 667, n.182 (2015).
335. See Aleaziz; Marcelo & Herbert, supra note 3 and accompanying text.
336. See Brian Naylor & Tamara Keith, Kamala Harris Tells Guatemalans Not to Migrate to the
United States, NPR (June 7, 2021, 10:55 PM), https://perma.cc/UM2P-XSXQ.
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ICE officers’ refusal to follow the dictates of courts or its leadership.337
Evidence of agency recalcitrance and resistance is emerging again as ICE
objected to the Biden administration’s enforcement priority directives and has
failed to follow them.338 This phenomenon in ICE serves as a case study for
scholarship that examines the role of line officers in defining administrative
law.339 In the realm of immigration enforcement, ICE officers modify and
reconstitute administrative policy through distorting its implementation. New
legal challenges that ICE officers, as a whole, have exceeded their authority by
creating administrative law in conflict with those charged (and approved by the
Senate) with setting the administration’s policies may therefore emerge.
Third, as discussed in Part I.A, punitive civil detention is not legal,340 and
therefore one of two remedies must follow. One option is to require the full
panoply of constitutional protections to attach to civil immigration detention
just as they do in criminal proceedings. This remedy flows from the Supreme
Court’s decision from more than a century ago concerning the use of punishment in immigration enforcement.341 The Court held that if the federal government imposed conditions of punishment as part of administrative
detention, then migrants must be afforded the constitutional protections associated with punishment.342 These protections would include the right to counsel at the government’s expense, the right to a jury, and prohibitions on cruel
and unusual punishment.343 In light of data demonstrating that detention does
not follow risk, the case for a right to counsel for detained migrants in particularly strong. By stacking a punitive immigration detention system on top of
criminal detention, the stakes and the coercive force of the state are equivalent and replicated in both systems. Affording counsel allows detained
migrants to challenge the data used to detain them and any punitive purpose.
Alternatively, the Biden administration and Congress must confront head
on the culture and scale of ICE to eliminate its use of detention to punish and
deter. Here, our study coincides with calls for reducing, redirecting, and
reforming the role of immigration enforcement agents. Professor Peter
Markowitz has laid out a positive model for immigration enforcement that
would focus efforts on increasing the number of people who conform to the
immigration laws rather than punishing violators through detention and deportation.344 Professor Jennifer Lee Koh has proposed ways to downsize the
deportation state in order to minimize the opportunity for front line officers to
divert policy goals.345 Doris Meissner, former Commissioner of the
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See supra note 28 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 28, 33-34 and accompanying text.
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See Koh, supra note 26.
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Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”), proposes replacing reliance
on detention with a system that makes supervised release “the prevailing
method for exercising immigration custody” where necessary.346 Dora
Schriro suggests creating an alternative agency to ICE that would serve as the
gatekeeper and refer only a small number of migrants to ICE for detention.347
Both former administrators recognize that ICE’s enforcement culture represents a barrier to detention reform and propose locating responsibility for
release and community supervision in separate dedicated offices.348
The Biden administration, however, is headed in the opposite direction. In
its most recent announcement of enforcement priorities, the DHS Secretary
eliminated the prior requirement for preapproval of enforcement actions outside of the priority categories349 and instead stated that the Secretary leaves
the exercise of prosecutorial discretion to the judgment of ICE officers.350
The results of our study indicate that ICE officers will likely use this express
delegation of discretion from the top to implement detention as their policy
choice. Whether framed in terms of “abolishing ICE” or redirecting it, the
Biden administration cannot succeed in making immigration enforcement
fair or humane without dismantling the forces within ICE that have defeated
reform efforts in the past—something it appears increasingly reluctant to do.
CONCLUSION
Our research tells the story of how the RCA engaged in manipulation, subversion, and bias. It failed to enhance objectivity and transparency in detention decisions, failed to put a dent in mass detention, and instead seemed to
rationalize ever more draconian detention outcomes for immigrants. We presented data that show ICE detains low hanging fruit using the risk tool to provide a scientific veneer, beneath which everyone is designated a risk, and
almost everyone is detained without bond. Immigration detention policies
were hijacked by frontline officers bent on maximizing the detention of
immigrants. This occurred because frontline ICE officers were delegated a
large amount of discretion in finalizing detention decisions. That discretion
was used to manipulate the risk logic and confound efforts to create a rational
custody determination process.
ICE’s subversion of the risk classification tool provides two teachable lessons for the Biden administration. First, frontline ICE officers have the power
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to defeat an administration’s policy goals through their intransigence and
ability to manipulate its implementation. Second, ICE’s culture is fundamentally punitive. Rather than political appointees wearing down the intransigence of frontline agents, frontline agents won out over the political
appointees. Punitive bias subsumed and subverted efforts to challenge mass
detention. Consequently, migrants are unlikely to be treated humanely without subjecting ICE to radical and wholesale change.
Launched on the promise of reducing immigration detention, the RCA
ended up permitting and even encouraging the detention of nearly everyone
within ICE’s grasp. For the Biden administration to make good on its promises of decarceration, racial justice, and a humane immigration system, it
must learn from the mistakes in this decade-long, multi-million dollar experiment and heed the calls to dismantle the current enforcement apparatus and
put an end to its reliance on immigration incarceration.

